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Abstract:
The purpose of the thesis is to examine future international relations in the Arctic
as a theoretical exercise based on realism and liberalism. As the ice cap shrinks, and the
region’s environment changes, developing costs will decrease allowing for resourceextraction while new transit routes emerge. The opportunities to develop resources and
ship via the Arctic are economic and strategically valuable, altering the geopolitics of the
region. This thesis seeks to explore how resource development and new transit routes will
affect regional politics through the lens of two theories. The two theoretical approaches
will examine states and actors’ interests and possible actions. Concluding, that realism
will best describe the Arctic as states strive to be the regional hegemon by controlling
transit routes and resources or defending the regional status quo, creating tension and a
security competition between the U.S., China, and Russia. States will jockey for position
within institutions before the ice cap disappears and transit routes emerge. These states
seek to grow regional governance in their favor, providing support for a liberal
framework, and possibly creating a structure strong enough to reduce tension before
states strive to be the Arctic hegemon.
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Chapter 1:
Intro:
“We are entering the Age of the Arctic,” after the region was thought to be
inhospitable and undevelopable (Osherenko and Young 1989 p.3). States are jockeying
for legal and political control over resource development and shipping routes.
Militarization is starting to ensure security for future economic ventures and sovereignty
claims (Osherenko and Young 1989).
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States believed that
owning the Arctic allowed for control of the world, as the Arctic is the shortest route
between Moscow and Washington. The current strategic geopolitical importance of the
Arctic hasn’t reached similar levels as the Cold War. However, with climate change and a
shrinking ice cap, the Arctic’s geopolitical importance is rising. An ice-free Arctic will
open shorter shipping routes and allow for resource development.
It is estimated that the Arctic holds thirty percent of the world’s remaining
undeveloped natural gas, and thirteen percent of the world’s remaining undeveloped oil.
The two resources are estimated to be worth over 1 trillion dollars. It is believed that the
Arctic holds more fossil fuels than Saudi Arabia (U.S. Navy 2014). Around eighty-four
percent of the energy resources are located offshore (Gratz 2012). At the moment, there is
no indication of conflict in the Arctic because development is expensive. However,
conflict cannot be ruled out due to disputes between continental shelf claims, and the
future impact transit routes and energy will have on the region. The frozen Arctic
increases the costs for development when there are cheaper, easier to access oil and
natural gas deposits. The transit routes are too risky or impossible to use. “Climate
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change may start a scramble for resources not seen since the 19th-century gold rush in
California” (Lamy 2017 p. 80). This raises questions about resource and territorial claims
whose legal framework exists in an ad hoc, rudimentary form as the ice the ice melts and
new opportunities arise. (Lamy 2017).
Current levels of cooperation among states and international organizations keep
tensions low despite different interests on Arctic transit routes and energy. States believe
issues such as climate change and natural disasters are too broad and multifaceted for
single states to solve. The circle contains eight states, and many nations with historical
development. Multi-level agreements exist between governments and organizations.
There are two defined but opposing discourses on Arctic geopolitics. One discourse is
based on liberalism, focusing on peace and stability in the region through
institutionalized international cooperation. The realist perspective argues there is a race
for natural resources and economic interests that will produce regional conflicts
(Heininen, Sergunin, and Yarovoy 2014).
This thesis seeks to examine the future of Arctic transit and resource development
relations through realism, and liberalism as a theoretical exercise. The theories will
examine how states might potentially act within the Arctic theater. I argue the realist
theory will best describe the future of the Arctic since states will seek to protect their
interests and expand their economy. However, states will use force when necessary. The
region lacks binding institutions and law. States will use regional institutions to increase
their power and legitimacy while expanding their economy and military. However, other
forms of governance such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the
European Union (EU) are censured for expansion towards Russia. A liberal framework
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has a chance to cause regional tension, but liberal theory can also explain regional
stability since the 1980s. Future Arctic relations can either be: conflictual over resources
and transit; stable under a new regional/global order; or competing institutions’ use of
international law and favorable forums to influence regional policy. This paper seeks to
explore possible actions that will determine Arctic relations.
This thesis starts with the historical background of the region, and how climate
change will bring new opportunities for energy development and transit. Diplomacy is
used in the region to settle boundary disputes, but current problems and rising tensions
between great powers will lead to clashes of interest. Next, the paper explains liberal and
realist frameworks to describe Arctic relations based on regional governance and states’
Arctic policy. Finally, I argue, realism will be the best theory to explain the region
because states have proclaimed they will use force when necessary to defend their
economic interests. States will clash when their interests diverge, leading to regional
proxy and economic wars like the current ones in Syria and Ukraine.
Furthermore, Russia started militarizing the Arctic in 2008. Russia will continue
until they return to Cold War levels in anticipation of protecting their sovereignty and
developing resources. China also seeks new transit routes to expand the One Belt, One
Road initiative through a Polar Silk Road. This leaves the U.S., the West, and NATO
scrambling to avoid the Arctic turning into a Russian or Chinese sphere of influence.
Background:
Norway was the first state to claim Arctic waters with a Royal Decree in February
1812. In 1825, Great Britain and Russia signed a treaty demarcating their boundaries
around the North Pole. Russia later sold their western boundary, Alaska, to the U.S. in
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1867. In 1878, the Canadian Parliament asked the British Parliament to transfer the North
American Arctic to them. In the same year, the first Arctic organization formed with the
International Polar Commission. The commission organized the first International Polar
Year with eight governments participating (Schonfeldt 2017).
Two years later, Britain transferred all possessions in North America to Canada,
Britain ceded all Arctic territory with the transfer. Britain also had a dispute with the U.S.
over seals in the Bering Sea. The U.S. won the case after arbitration. Later, Britain and
the U.S. signed the Hay-Herbert Treaty to settle the boundary between Alaska and
Canada. Canada claimed sovereignty and started to patrol their northern archipelago after
the treaty (Schonfeldt 2017).
In 1920, the Svalbard Treaty gave the fourteen signature parties full sovereignty
over the islands and waters for industrial and mining enterprises. Currently, there are
forty-five signature parties to the Svalbard Treaty. Two years later, the U.S.S.R. tried but
failed to establish a transit route between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. However, the
Soviet Union established polar research stations. The Soviet government later demarcated
its borders in 1926, claiming the Svalbard area of the Bering Sea, and parts of the North
Pole (Heininen 2017). Before World War II, the second International Polar Year took
place with forty governments participating.
The Arctic Ocean and the Norwegian Sea provided shipping routes to Murmansk
to assist the Soviet Union as part of the U.S. Lend-Lease program. The U.S. also built the
Thule Air Base in Greenland during World War II. After the war, Canada and the U.S.
agreed to joint defense measures in the Arctic. Regional governance began with the
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creation of the Nordic Saami Council as a forum for Saami people across Finland,
Norway, Sweden and the Soviet Union (Schonfeldt 2017).
The U.S.S.R. released a statute defining Soviet waters as any body of water that
historically belonged to the Russian Federation in 1960. The U.S.S.R. offered the
Northern Sea Route as an alternative route when the Suez Canal closed due to the ArabIsraeli War of 1967. This venture was unsuccessful. The United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) conference started in 1973. American President Ronald
Reagan announced the establishment of the U.S. exclusive economic zone (EEZ) without
signing the convention in 1980. However, socialist countries proclaimed the U.S. was
trying to undermine UNCLOS. The Arctic came under traditional classical security
geopolitics as states sought to control territory to serve as a defense buffer and develop
resources during the Cold War. As the Soviet Union and the U.S. competed in an arms
race, the Arctic transformed into a military flank and a battle for the sea-lanes of
communication (SLOC) between Europe and America (Heininen 2017).
Reagan and Gorbachev met in December 1987 to support the development of
regional cooperation based on Gorbachev’s Arctic zone of peace speech. Later in 1990,
the two states signed the Shevardnadze-Baker agreement, agreeing to resolve unregulated
fishing in the Bering Sea Donut Hole. The Donut Hole is an international area between
the coastal waters of the U.S. and Russia that had lucrative pollack fishing.
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Figure 1 Map of the Bearing Sea Donut Hole found in (Bailey 2011)

Japan, Norway, and Russia established the International Northern Sea Route Program to
study shipping lanes in 1993. The UN established the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf (CLCS), allowing states to extend their EEZ to 350 nautical miles or
150 nautical miles past the UNCLOS EEZ limit in 1997.
Four years later, Russia made a submission to CLCS, arguing the Lomonosov and
the Mendeleev Ridges as extensions of the Siberian Shelf of the Eurasia continent. To
further prove their claim, scientists traveled the ocean floor to take soil samples from the
Mir-1 and Mir-2 bathyscaphes while planting a Russian flag at the North Pole. The flag
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created an outrage. Canadian Foreign Minister, Peter MacKay stated, “This isn’t the 15th
century. You can’t go around the world and just plant flags and say, ‘We’re claiming this
territory” (Alexandrov 2009). However, Danish and Canadian scientists argue the
Lomonosov Ridge is an elevator ridge attached to the older Greenland and North
American plates (Powell 2010). Until recently, Arctic resources were too difficult to
develop; however, a melting ice cap and future ice-free transit routes heat up the Arctic’s
geopolitics.
Historically, Arctic development was too costly and risky to undertake. The cost
and risks left many states and companies uninterested in Arctic expansion. However, the
Arctic ice cap is at the lowest ever since satellites started keeping records (Carrington
2017) and estimated to shrink more.

Figure 2 NOAA GFDL Climate Research Highlights Image Gallery from
(NOAA 2016)
Arctic resources and transit routes are becoming a safer investment to develop due
to the thinning ice cap reducing costs and risk. States have strategic interests in either
developing energy or securing transit routes. Russia, the U.S., and Canada see the Arctic
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as a natural barrier, and the opening of the Arctic creates security problems. Furthermore,
Russia and China need oil and trade to increase their economy and military. Russia’s
expansion to China and Asia has the potential to end Russia’s dependency on Europe’s
markets. However, Europe imports energy from unstable regions and wants a steady,
secure independent source (Krickovic 2015). Finally, Canada and the U.S. seek to
develop national resources to become energy independent. International relations are a
bargaining game for the distribution and redistribution of resources (Legro and
Moravcsik 1999). “Economic and technological competition is as often as keen as
military competition” (Waltz 1993 p. 57).
Conflict previously mitigated:
States settled border disputes diplomatically, Canada and Denmark agreed on the
Hans Island delimitation in 1973, later ratified by the UN. Iceland and Norway signed an
agreement in 1981 to demarcate the continental shelf between Iceland and Jan Mayen.
Iceland also reached an agreement with Norway and Denmark in 2006 for Iceland’s
claim of 200 miles in the Norwegian Sea.
Russia and Norway used UNCLOS to set the maritime limit for the Barents Sea in
2010. “It has removed a potential source of conflict between Norway and Russia and is
an excellent example of current cooperative attitudes in the High North” (Luszcak 2017
p. 42). The Barents Sea has fisheries and natural resources, including a vast amount of
energy resources. In 2006, Russia, Norway, Iceland, and Denmark agreed to a modus
vivendi for claiming continental shelves beyond 200 nautical miles. In late 2010, Norway
and Russia signed a new treaty dividing the disputed area into two halves, thus defining
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the boundaries for energy resource development. It appears both Russia and Norway seek
to mitigate their dispute through diplomatic means according to international law.
“Arctic States have on several occasions declared their commitment to resolve
and, in some cases, have worked towards resolving possible conflicts of interests
according to the principles of international law” (Schönfeldt 2017 p. 59). Small powers in
the Arctic have a history of cooperation, and the region also produced cooperation
between a great power and smaller powers. However, great power cooperation with other
great powers is limited in the region. Only the future can tell whether international
organizations are strong enough to keep states committed to agreements and thus, being
able to defuse all the possible points of tension in the Arctic.
Current problems:
The Northwest Passage has a minor conflict over the designation. The U.S.
regards the passage as an international strait, while Canada believes it’s their internal
water. If the passage is designated as an international strait, then no states need to ask for
permission to use it. If it is designated as internal Canadian waters, then foreign ships
must ask Canada for permission to pass. It’s unlikely the U.S. will grant Canada’s claim,
as it would set a precedent for Russia to claim the Northern Sea Route, China to claim the
South China Seas, and for Iran to claim the Strait of Hormuz as internal waters (Huebert
2009). However, as Canada and the U.S. regard each other as strategic partners, the U.S.
probably won’t publicly challenge Canada’s designation of the Northwest Passage.
The disputed Bering Sea has three potential issues. First, the Bering Sea is an
important area for Russian and American fishing industries. In 2006, the area was worth
$600 billion for the Russians, and around $1 billion for the U.S. Second, the effect
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hydrocarbons and other natural resources play in the Bering Sea and the adjacent East
Siberian and Chukchi Seas where maritime and continental shelves are not agreed upon.
Finally, the Bering Sea is an important junction between Asia, Europe, and North
America with trade and security concerns (Kaczynski 2007).
When Russia sold Alaska to the U.S. in 1867, the treaty outlined maritime
boundaries but not EEZs or continental shelves. The two states exchanged diplomatic
notes in 1977 to demarcate the border. However, different interpretations of the treaty led
to an overlap of about 15,000 square nautical miles. Both states signed the BakerShevardnadze Agreement to split the difference between the U.S. claim on a geodetic
line, and a rhomb line used by the Soviets in 1990 (Kaczynski 2007). However, the new
Russian government claimed the agreement invalid since the Soviet Foreign Minister
Eduard Shevardnadze did not represent Russia’s interests. Russia failed to ratify the
agreement since Shevardnadze ceded the Neversink fields, the Aleut hydrocarbon fields,
as well as fishing areas and quotas for concessions (Heininen, Sergunin, and Yarovoy
2014). As of today, there is no formal agreement on the demarcation in the Bering Sea,
but the U.S. enforces the 1990 treaty (Kaczynski 2007). The U.S. Senate quickly ratified
the deal to lease off energy resource claims (Heininen, Sergunin, and Yarovoy 2014).
Moscow formally observes the agreement, thus providing evidence of opinio juris
practice. The Bering Sea will remain conflict-free as resources and transit are currently
too difficult and costly.
Norway and Russia have a fishing dispute around Spitsbergen. Norway claims a
200-mile EEZ around Spitsbergen and regards Russian fishing in the area as poaching.
The Norwegian Navy arrested Russian fisherman leading to regular patrols by Russia's
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Northern Fleet. (Heininen, Sergunin and Yarovoy 2014). However, Norway’s Statoil,
France’s Total, and Russia’s Gazprom signed a joint agreement to form the Shtokman
Development AG Company to develop the Shtokman field. Statoil and Russia's Rosneft
also formed a consortium for joint development in the Barents Sea and the Sea of
Okhotsk. While there is a fishing dispute, the need for energy fostered cooperation and
stability to develop resources. It appears Spitsbergen will remain conflict free with
economic development and past Norwegian and Russian diplomacy.
Denmark and Russia have conflicting claims over the Lomonosov Ridge. Russia
made the first UNCLCS submission in 2001 but rejected for insufficient evidence.
Danish scientists claim the Lomonosov Ridge connects to the Greenland and North
American plate. As a smaller power, Denmark doesn’t want to challenge Russia by force
preferring to work through institutions and agreements (Denmark 2016).
Canada has territorial disputes over the Lomonosov Ridge, the Hans Island, the
borderline of the Lincoln Sea, and the border of the Beaufort Sea with Denmark. Both
Canada and Denmark submitted a request to UNCLOS in 2013, claiming part of the
Lomonosov Ridge between the North Pole and Ellesmere Island. It seems this conflict
will remain out of the public’s eye without an increase in tension between the two states
since both are NATO members.
Tensions in the Arctic will rise if states can’t solve territorial and resource
disputes diplomatically. Currently, states are not emphasizing their regional conflicts
while using Arctic institutions and international law to mitigate conflict. However, if
UNCLCS rules the Lomonosov Ridge as Danish, Canadian or American, this could cause
tension as Russia believes they legally have right to the ridge and its resources.
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Possible points of tension:
The unresolved territorial claims in the Barents Sea, the Bering Strait, and the
Beaufort Sea will remain possible points of tension until resolved. States are increasing
their militaries to claim and signal sovereignty in the Arctic. To signal sovereignty,
Arctic states are increasing their surveillance of territorial waters and EEZs, search and
rescue operations, and environmental protection.
The U.S.S.R. first regulated transportation through the Northern Sea Routes and
Russia still tries to regulate the conditions of passage since the route is within their EEZ.
However, the U.S. rejects the regulations, claiming the route as an international strait and
argues Russia is acting beyond its territorial waters. Russia attempts to institutionalize
these regulations by investing in northern ports and regional patrols to establish
jurisdiction. However, before Western sanctions, Russian and American companies,
Rosneft, and ExxonMobil had deals to develop the Kara Sea for energy. Both Russia and
the U.S. seek to develop resources in the region.
States that ratify UNCLOS must submit claims to the CLCS within ten years of
acceding to the convention. All states assured their commitment to abide by the
Convention despite the U.S. not ratifying UNCLOS. It is “estimated that about 88 percent
of the seabed of the Arctic Ocean would be under the control of the Arctic littoral states if
the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf were to approve all the existing or
expected claims to the Arctic Ocean continental shelf” (Heininen 2017 p. 46). However,
non-Arctic states may also stake a claim to the Arctic without acknowledging UNCLOS
or the International Seabed Authority. If continental shelf claims are granted, it would
limit China’s access to shipping routes and resource development. Both Canada and
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Russia favor classifying the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage as internal
waters for economic reasons (Heininen, Sergunin, and Yarovoy 2014). However, the U.S.
opposes them being designated internal waters. Continental shelf claims that don’t rule in
favor of a state could lead to disputes and possible military posturing. The current
military build-up in the region is not for a large-scale war, rather to protect economic
interests and territorial sovereignty.
Danish Foreign Minister Per Stig Møller thought the “Arctic Five” should be able
to solve the region’s problems in 2007. The five included the U.S., Russia, Canada,
Denmark, and Norway, all with Arctic coastal waters. “It remains unlikely that any of the
five Arctic littoral states will risk a large-scale, intrastate military conflict. There remains
a possibility that tensions could increase due to misperceptions, and rhetoric, as well as
the unforeseen dynamics of economic interests in the region” (U.S. Navy 2014 p. 14).
Iceland complained about the Arctic Five and argued any decision without Reykjavik,
Helsinki, Stockholm, and indigenous groups is not valid. The complaints paid off since
the Arctic Five did not institutionalize any policy. Subsequently, the Arctic Council has
been the main institute for regional policy (Guschin 2015).
Chinese companies Sinosteel and China Communications Construction Corp.
formed a joint mining company with London Mining to produce magnetite in Greenland.
Kvanefjeld Mine is estimated to have one of the largest rare earth elements deposits and
a copious amount of uranium. Chinese control over Kvanefjeld is a strategic asset
allowing China to influence global prices as China already controls the majority of rare
earth element development (Alexeeva and Lasserre 2012/3). China also invests in a
ferrosilicium plant in Iceland, ferrosilicium is essential to the mass production of solar
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panels. This increases China’s dominance over the emerging solar energy sector. Norway
also exports iron ore, methane, and oil to China (Alexeeva and Lasserre 2012/3). Finally,
when Arctic sea lines melt, Chinese ships would be able to bypass the Strait of Malacca,
the Strait of Hormuz, and the Suez Canal, each with heavy traffic and security concerns,
while decreasing shipping time.
“China attributes significant importance to its energy and economic partnership
with Russia in the Arctic zone” (Alexeeva and Lasserre 2012/3 p.66). Moscow believes
China is an Arctic investment partner (Blank 2012). Putin has promoted the development
of Sino-Russian ties and cooperation in the Arctic (Alexeeva and Lasserre 2012/3).
Putin’s office released a statement “the unprecedented high level of relations between
Russia and China achieved recently due to the personal efforts of Xi Jinping,” (President
of Russia 2018). “Currently, the China-Russia comprehensive strategic cooperative
partnership is at the best level in history, which sets an example for building a new type
of international relations,” stated Xi in March (Xinhua 2018). China seeks to keep
promoting Sino-Russia relations (Xinhua 2018). However, both Russia and China lack
the knowledge and equipment for Arctic resource extraction. China wants to increase
exploration of resources since they are a large energy consumer (Alexeeva and Lasserre
2012/3). China’s private CEFC Energy bought a stake in Russian state-owned Rosneft
early in 2017 (Mazneva, Bierman and Blas 2017). CNPC, China National Petroleum
Corporation, a state-owned enterprise, bought a stake in Rosneft in 2013 (Rosneft
Information Division 2017). Russia is now the top exporter of oil to China and plans to
supply natural gas to China by 2019 (Aizhu, Mason, and Li 2018 and Cheong 2018).
CEFC and Rosneft also have plans for joint development projects (Mazneva, Bierman
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and Blas 2017). This Chinese-Russian relationship benefits both sides as China is able to
ensure energy security while Russia can increase tax revenue to build their economy.
However, Putin and Xi are described as “a marriage of convenience at best” with the
prospect of devolving into an Arctic rivalry when Chinese Silk Road and Russian
Northern Sea Route interests diverge (O’Connor 2018). Past Sino-Russian relations have
been rocky which included deaths in a border dispute in 1969. Russians in Russia’s Far
East worry about growing Chinese influence and migration as a way for Beijing to annex
lost territory. The Chinese believe the Aigun Treaty between the Qing Dynasty and the
Russia Empire was signed when China was weak, leading to an unfair agreement still
imposed on them (Tselichtechev 2017).
Northern Eagle was an example of military cooperation but included two
superpowers, the U.S. and Russia. Between 2004 and 2014, the U.S., Russia, and Norway
conducted military exercises in the Barents Sea and the Northern Sea Route (Luszcak
2017). However, the biennial exercises were suspended in 2014.
“Although the Department of Defense finds value in the military-tomilitary relationship with the Russian Federation we have developed over the past
few years to increase transparency, build understanding, and reduce the risk of
military miscalculation we have, in light of recent events in Ukraine, put on hold
all military-to-military engagements between the United States and Russia,”
stated chief Pentagon spokesman, Rear Adm. John Kirby (LaGrone and
Majumdar 2014).
NATO and the U.S. ordered Russia to leave Ukraine, as the Ukrainian conflict
and other breaches in international law by Russia pose a challenge to Euro-Atlantic and
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Arctic security (NATO 2014). “The underlying problem seems to be a persisting lack of
certainty about other actors’ peaceful intentions” (Atland 2014 p. 146). States signaled
that they seek peace in the Arctic, but Russia has increased their military capacity in the
region. Currently, the U.S. has other, more pressing security challenges, but that does not
exclude the possibility of conflict in the Arctic due to Russian aggression. Given this
context, Russia and China will cooperate to balance against the U.S. because they will
increase their chance of survival (Waltz 1979) by creating spheres of influence to serve
their economic needs. The smaller powers in the region will bandwagon with either the
U.S. under NATO or Russia but won’t make enough of a difference to shift the balance
of power to either side.
Russia and the U.S. use their nuclear assets in the Arctic for sovereignty claims
and defense. An ice-free Arctic would allow the U.S. to escape from their lack of
icebreakers as the U.S. only has two icebreakers compared to Russia’s forty-one
icebreakers. The melted Arctic would allow the normal U.S. navy to operate in the region
and ensure the freedom of navigation.
Also, the U.S. is shifting their ballistic missile defense to sea-based components.
This activity might trigger manifestations of the United States projecting naval power in a
region that Russia claims, such actions carry the risk of misunderstanding of intentions
possibly sparking a security dilemma. Russia had a strong reaction to the U.S./NATO
proposed interceptor missiles as part of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system in
the Czech Republic and Poland (Luszczak 2017). Putin suggested Russia would not
comply with the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty and threatened to suspend
all ties with NATO if the U.S. built the new system. In 2015, Mikhail Vanin, Russian
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ambassador to Denmark, wrote an editorial to Jyllands-Posten, a Danish paper, stating
that Denmark’s ships would be targets of Russian missiles if they joined NATO’s missile
defense system (Herszenhorn 2015). The opening of Arctic seas to western ships might
make Putin nervous as he seeks natural barriers to protect against any invasion, possibly
giving Putin an incentive to attack first.
“As Russia re-emerges from decades of economic stagnation and considers its
national future, the Arctic is, once again, a central focus. The Russian vision of the Arctic
is as a source of material strength and national power” (Emmerson 2010 p. 69). As
sovereignty claims and aggressive actions increase so will the tension between actors
unless Arctic governance keeps the region stable. Realism will become the best
framework to describe Arctic relations when development costs become cheaper and
transit is safer. Economic interests will then trump regional cooperation. Currently, it
seems like liberalism would best describe Arctic international relations. This is because
regional governance based on mutual interests increased significantly since the end of the
Cold War. However, the stakes were low since development was nearly impossible and
extremely costly. Second, some states don’t want Arctic governance to focus on security
issues because they do not want to limit their sovereignty in the region and Russia
worries about NATO and the EU expanding to their border. Third, the U.S. and Russia
will most likely not be able to solve the “easy disputes” of Syria, Ukraine, and border
issues. Forth, the U.S. is unlikely to end sanctions on Russia, further impeding any Arctic
cooperation between the two states. Finally, the Arctic has no framework or lacks a
strong enough collective security to stop a large power from partaking in unilateral action
when its interests are challenged. These reasons are why a liberal framework will be
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unable to explain the region. “The tectonic shifts that are happening are the rise of a
powerful China… and the resurgence of a weak, but very dangerous, and well-armed
Russia, so the return of a period of great power competition is happening” (Flournoy
2017). However, if the U.S. cedes it global hegemonic status and doesn’t secure its
interests, Russia and China would create their own regional order based on the Silk Road
economic bloc, allowing the Arctic to remain stable.
Russia and China seek to be the regional hegemon or create a sphere of influence
since projecting force across the world is costly and hard. Under the One Belt, One Road
initiative, China seeks to establish a trade block with sixty states, hoping to shift the
global economy to its favor, altering the global balance of power. China seeks safe polar
routes protected by Russian forces. Once states have an Arctic regional sphere that suits
them, states will protect their interests by any means necessary. America can either allow
the new Polar Silk Road and a shift in the balance of power or seek to stymie the progress
through sanctions/force. As China shifts to new markets and an economic bloc centered
on them, U.S. dependence on Chinese goods could be a weakness to exploit by Beijing.
“Rivals like China and Russia that challenge our interests, our economy, and our values.
In confronting these dangers, we know that weakness is the surest path to conflict, and
unmatched power is the surest means of our defense” (White House 2018). There will
always be security competition, and it will be intense at times when states seek either
regional or global hegemony.
The next chapter explains how liberalist and realist theories can be a framework
to explain Arctic relations. In Chapter Three, Arctic governance and state’s Arctic
policies will be analyzed to predict potential actions in the region. Chapter Four is a
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foreign policy analysis of the region and how states’ policies will influence their
strategies. In Chapter Five, liberal and realist frameworks will explain possible outcomes
based on states’ strategies and policies. Finally, Chapter Six is the conclusion, explaining
why realism will be the best framework for describing Arctic international relations.
Finally, I argue, realism will be the best framework to explain the region due to states
willingness to use force when necessary when their interests diverge. However, the U.S.
will cede regional power to Russia and China, allowing them to form a new economic
bloc.

20

Chapter 2:
Literature Review: Two theories of International Relations:
“No single approach can capture all the complexity of contemporary world
politics. Therefore, we are better off with a diverse array of competing ideas rather than a
single theoretical orthodoxy” (Walt 1998 p. 29). Arctic institutions and organizations
expanded in scope, size, and number, providing evidence for a liberal framework.
However, regional powers stated they will use force to protect their interests when
diplomacy doesn’t work, best explained through realism. All theories are useful in the
intellectual toolbox. Each theory has its strengths but also has its weakness. However, it
appears Arctic governance won’t be able to deescalate rising tensions between regional
powers, leading to a clash of interests, best explained through realism.
Realists argue institutions reflect the global power balance, and changes in the
balance generate changes in institutions (Walt 1998). Russia and China want to grow
Arctic governance to favor their economic development and change the global balance of
power. Regional governance in Russia’s favor will allow them to design their sphere of
influence. China seeks to grow its influence in Arctic governance to shape transit policy
for their Polar Silk Road, potentially allowing the One Belt, One Road to span all of
Eurasia. However, the U.S. is reluctant to increase Arctic governance or spend money in
the region as the U.S. has other priorities around the world. American leaders are starting
to focus on great power competition (Flournoy 2017 and Coats 2018), ensuring a future
Arctic pivot, as the region is crucial to both Russian and Chinese interests. Russia and the
U.S. would use force when necessary in the region to protect their interests, which center
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on energy development and transit routes. The U.S. seeks to protect the status quo while
Russia and China wish to shift the balance of power away from the United States.
International relations are bargaining over the distribution of resources or an incessant
competition for resources. There is the possibility of conflict between states over any
valued good, ranging from economic interests/goods, territory, and political/economic
ideology (Legro and Moravcsik 1999). It appears state interests for energy and trade
routes will cause conflict in the region. The literature review focuses on realist and liberal
theoretical approaches of international relations. The theories will frame the argument
and form conclusions based on each state’s Arctic policy and actions.
Liberalism:
In the liberal perspective, the world has order and a hierarchy structured by
institutions’ laws and rules despite global anarchy. The fundamental premise of
liberalism is the relation between states and international society because international
society influences and shapes state behavior through social purposes (Moravcsik 1997).
States still compete but cooperate on economic and other issues under the auspices of
institutions. Institutions create common rules, principles, and standards of behavior that
constrain state action but foster long-term cooperation through mutual benefits. Arctic
organizations were formed to focus on common interests based on search and rescue,
environmental protection, economic development, and indigenous rights. The Arctic
politically is characterized by years of cooperation, the absence of war, and adherence to
the law creating a stable political order (Wegge 2011). By strengthening the legal Arctic
framework, the region can attract international investment and development (Ebinger and
Zambetakis 2009).
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Power is defined by bargaining and negotiation and a state’s willingness to spend
resources or make concessions to fulfill their preferences. Institutions reduce transaction
costs to increase information being shared and mitigate the fear of defection. However,
Russia is striving for favorable Arctic governance to increase their regional influence. On
the other hand, the U.S. prefers regional diplomacy through unilateral, bilateral or
multilateral negotiations depending on what suits their interests. America is against
increasing international organizations that might impede U.S. sovereignty or curtail any
action in the region. “It is the position of the United States that the Arctic Council should
remain a high-level forum devoted to issues within its current mandate and not be
transformed into a formal international organization” (White House 2009 p.4).
Since parties are not likely to increase the Arctic Council or sign a regional treaty,
Young argues for the development of a governance structure in a sense of linked
agreements that address specific topics but builds up a comprehensive regional structure
(Young 2011). Past search and rescue, pollution, and climate agreements can be the
foundation for the regional structure Young proposed. The U.S. and Russia have been
willing to enter these types of deals in the past, even though they are reluctant to cede
sovereignty to regional organizations. The prospect of this type of diplomacy can be a
means to reduce tension and improve cooperation (Exner-Pirot 2012). The Arctic should
not expect a regional governance structure to be built among linked agreements. Young
makes a case for growing regional governance, but these agreements are better solved
through multilateral arrangements rather than states trying to mitigate pollution or climate
change by themselves. When states have diverging interests in security or economic

23

issues, a linked agreement won’t be formed because states don’t share mutual interests.
This refutes Young for an all-encompassing regional governance structure.
Hegemonic stability is when one state is so dominant that it can create and uphold
a military and economic order with strong regimes that reflect the great power’s interests,
with Pax Britannica and Pax Americana as examples. The U.S. should not be considered
the Arctic hegemon since the Arctic Council and UNCLOS are not American priorities
(Wegge 2011). Stokke argues most Arctic institutions were established in the late 1980s
to improve relations between the West and Russia to reduce tension in the area (Stokke
2012). However, Russia is seeking the Arctic hegemony to turn the region into a resource
base. This would allow Russia to create a stable system based on international law that
benefits their economy. If the regional order, international law, and military balance are
in Russia’s favor, Russia will advocate for a stable region because it’s more cost-effective
to achieve their goals than through military force.
Axelrod and Keohane argue there are three dimensions of international relations:
mutuality of interest, the future, and the number of actors (Axelrod and Keohane 1985).
If states have similar interests the likelihood of cooperation goes up. Alternatively, the
greater the level of conflict between actors, the less likely they are to cooperate (Axelrod
and Keohane 1985). States involved in Arctic governance have mutual interests in
economic development and environmental protection, which is why cooperation is high
in the Arctic, even though Russia and the U.S. have different interests in security.
Moscow and China are both open to cooperation and investment opportunities in the
region. Doing so, the two states seek diplomatic, and economic stability via regional
governance structures (Konyshev and Sergunin 2014).
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Keohane and Martin expect states to form institutions to normalize relations when
states benefit from cooperation. “Institutions can provide information, reduce transaction
costs, make commitments more credible, establish focal points for coordination, and in
general facilitate the operation of reciprocity.” Institutions define the range of behavior
states and actors can take to preserve the cooperative order by setting standards and rules.
As a result, institutions promote and deepen ties between states to develop mechanisms of
cooperation (Kupchan and Kupchan 1991). Interactions between states create issuelinkages fostering interdependence. The more states are connected, the more a state hurts
itself when cheating (Lipson 1984). Keohane and Nye argue complex interdependence is
reciprocal effects among actors when there is no hierarchy among policies, the presence
of multiple channels of contact, and the irrelevance of military (Keohane and Nye 2012).
Byers believes the Arctic has become an example of complex interdependence since the
region doesn’t focus on just one or a few topics; the multiple channels of contact between
scientists, organizations and bureaucrats; and the reduced tension since the end of the
Cold War (Byers 2017). Byers is partially wrong because while there is some complex
interdependence, states had little interest in asserting their unilateral goals in the region
due to development cost and risk. States and scientists are cooperating, but Russia and
America have cut each other off in the security realm. If Northern Eagle continued,
Russia joined NATO in the 1990s and other forms of military cooperation were taking
place in the region, Byers argument for Arctic complex interdependence would be
stronger.
Keohane and Martin argue cooperation and institutions make a difference in
global power realities and influence international relations (Keohane and Martin 1995 p.

25

42). States waging war harm their own interests in the complex interdependence of the
region (Byers 2017). Both intergovernmental and interregional cooperation in Arctic
organizations led to high stability in the region through regional standards (Heininen
2017). Currently, the Arctic is governed by eight highly developed states that cooperate
more than in any other time in history.
Institutions matter when states are concerned about absolute gains because
institutes administer agreements that benefit all parties (Keohane and Martin 1995).
International agreements like UNCLOS and organizations such as UNCLCS and the
Arctic Council seek to mitigate conflict to create stability to ensure states have a gain
(Wang 2012). Absolute gains are important under liberalism, while relative gains matter
for a realist. Relative gains compare what state A gained compared to state B, so each
state seeking relative gains enters agreements in which they will have the largest gain.
However, for absolute gains, institutions help mitigate fears of unequal gains through the
exchange of information thus allowing each state to evenly gain (Keohane and Martin
1995).
International relations are best explained by states’ fear of cheating and being
taken advantage of or state A cooperating and state B defecting. The cost of resource
development is high and transit routes can’t be accessed, so there is not yet a reason for
states to defect from international organizations. However, cheating and defection are
discouraged because it raises the cost of future gains through cooperation. Though, the
U.S. imposed sanctions on Russia, reducing cooperation between the two states, giving
Russia an incentive to cheat since it won’t hurt any future gains from cooperation. If the
U.S. doesn’t remove sanctions on Russia, this will limit regional cooperation.
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Abbott and Snidal argue “that international actors choose softer forms of legalized
governance when those forms offer superior institutional solutions” (Abbott and Snidal
2000 p. 421). Hard law reduces transaction costs, strengthens the agreement’s reputation,
expands the institution’s political strategies, and resolves issues with incomplete
contracting. However, hard law also entails costs, and hard law limits states’ behavior
and their sovereignty. Abbott and Snidal believe states often choose softer forms of
legalization to hard law because it has fewer restrictions. States, though, will seek hard
law when it favors or is advantageous for them. Arctic organizations lack hard law
because the U.S. does not want to cede sovereignty or limit future behavior because it is
tied to a binding treaty. Flake argues a mitigating factor in the Arctic is the “abundance of
very resolvable disputes” between the West and Russia (Flake 2017 p. 18), however,
there is little progress to resolve those disputes. The regional governance structures and
past agreements eliminated most sources of major conflict. However, maritime
jurisdiction is still controversial. Russia believes international law favors their national
interests, and cooperation can best secure that goal (Flake 2017). “This brings the
Russian behavior (at least regionally, not globally) closer to the soft power model”
(Konyshev and Sergunin 2014 p. 134). If the U.S. and Russia can resolve disputes such
as Ukraine, Syria, and border conflicts between Russia and other western states (Flake
2017) this will greatly reduce support for realism as an explanatory framework for Arctic
relations.
Before the Arctic becomes a battlefield for economic gains, regional
organizations need to build on maritime regulation, environmental protection, and
military limits to increase regional complex interdependence. The Arctic established soft
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law setting the norms and regulating behavior; however, the Arctic has two binding
treaties. Regional, smaller power states are committed to using diplomacy to solve
conflicts, which can be used to keep the Arctic stable and cooperative.
Arctic governance will continue to grow providing evidence for liberalism. Actors
within the Arctic are interdependent via various organizations and institutions. Regional
actors seek a stable Arctic where issue linkages are created via mutual economic and
environmental interests. As low-level policy, such as policy focused on human welfare,
indigenous rights, economic development and environmental protection becomes
institutionalized through norms, issue linkages will spread to high-level policy such as
security and sovereignty issues, which focus on the survival of the state, incentivizing
cooperation.
Realism:
In the realist perspective, the world order rests on the distribution of power, which
can create stability as well as war. When states struggle for power, they tend to go to war.
The Arctic has two regional powers and abundant resources while an emerging power
seeking to expand its global reach “makes it almost certain that the Arctic will not
conform to the attributes of an integrated region in the foreseeable future” (Mottola 1988
p. 6).
The system is anarchic because the international system lacks authority and a
mechanism to act as an arbitrator for states. Realists argue interstate behavior is
uncooperative, distrustful, uncertain, and tense due to anarchy. States must protect their
own interests to ensure survival. Dmitri Medvedev, the former Russian president, stated
Russia seeks to turn the Arctic into their resource base and a sphere of influence. China
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also seeks to secure transits routes to consolidate a sphere of influence in Eurasia under
their One Belt, One Road initiative while other middle powers seek to develop resources
in the region.

Figure 3 Map of China’s Polar Extension to Silk Road (Noi 2018)
China’s Arctic strategy is the Polar Silk Road that would link Europe with China
via the Arctic (Johnson and Standish 2018). “After the Northwest Passage is opened up it
will become a new axial sea route between the Atlantic and Pacific… whoever controls
the Arctic sea route will control the world economy and a new internationally strategic
corridor” (Wright 2011 p. 1). However, the U.S. seeks to maintain a favorable balance of
power in the Arctic and around the globe (DOD 2018), which might clash with other
powers’ interests. Sharp argues that Arctic security should consider CLCS and whether it
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is a security enabler by providing a framework for EEZ claims or a source of security
stress due to its narrow mandate that doesn’t consider the regional geopolitics (Sharp
2011). If UNCLOS’ Lomonosov Ridge ruling is in favor of Denmark, this could cause
Russia to take military action or disregard international law since they ensured their
interests through law.
A realist strives to be the hegemon or the only great power in the system, thus
controlling the system and the actors (Mearsheimer 2014). States must determine whether
other states are revisionist or fine with the status quo. America as the current sole
superpower is having its influence challenged across the globe, and the Arctic isn’t
excluded from rising tensions. Both Russia and China are revisionist states seeking to
establish spheres of influence, one an Arctic sphere and the other a Eurasia sphere to
become regional hegemons. The lack of institutional framework and the shift away from
unipolarity is unlikely to keep the region stable (Murray 2012).
According to a realist, states fear each other and always anticipate danger. Fear is
a motivator for a state’s foreign policy since states are aware of the consequences of
being a victim of an aggressor. States must be prepared to defend or live at the mercy of
other states since no supreme authority will stop an aggressor. However, the political
system in which they interact will place structural constraints on their actions (Waltz
1979). The Arctic transit routes not only serve as an economic interest but are
fundamental to a state’s naval strategy (Gratz 2012). “In facing this real and quite
unpredictable scrabble and battle for the Arctic and the probability of some countries
dividing up the Arctic melon with the aid of geographical advantage and military might,
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if peaceful means cannot produce the anticipated effects, war becomes the only method
for resolving the issue” (Wright 2011 p. 6).
States are rarely content with the current balance of power unless they are the
hegemon, so states have a constant incentive to shift the distribution of power to favor
them. “The central challenge to U.S. prosperity and security is the reemergence of longterm strategic competition by… revisionist powers” (DOD 2018 p. 2). The great power in
the system will defend the status quo, while other states try to undermine the distribution
of power. Sometimes, the costs and risks of changing the distribution of power are too
high, forcing states to wait for a more favorable situation. The U.S. can either willingly
cede the regional hegemon and allow a new regional order or the U.S. can try to keep
their global hegemon. If the U.S. remains absent from the region, a divorce from the
marriage of convenience might take place as both Russia and China will be competing
against each other to establish their own sphere of influence. Sino-Russia relations will
tense up again.
In the system of international politics, states must be aware of their power in
relation to other states in the system to help ensure their state survives. Russia and China,
led by authoritative leadership, seek to maximize their power by creating a sphere of
influence, leading to competitive situations with the U.S. However, it does not appear
that either Russia nor China will seek to fully dominate the U.S. since a total war with
nuclear weapons might lead to the downfall of a state, making survival impossible.
Mearsheimer believes it’s the structure of the international system that forces
states to seek power. All great powers have the same incentive – survival. The best
deterrence against another state attacking is to be powerful enough to protect the
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homeland. “Great powers are trapped in an iron cage where they have little choice to
compete with each other for power if they hope to survive” (Mearsheimer 2013, p. 72).
Russia has little choice but to develop the Arctic to jumpstart their stagnant economy to
stop Western expansion into former Soviet territories and avoid domestic strife. China
seeks an economic network to rival American centered trade deals while the U.S. hopes
to remain the global hegemon.
The divide between neo-realists stems from the question: how much power is
enough? The offense/defense balance is argued by Robert Jervis, Jack Snyder, and
Stephen Van Evera that military power can be categorized as either favoring
offensive/aggressive states or defensive/status quo states. They argue that if defense has
an advantage over offense, conquest is difficult. States then have little reason to use
force. They focus on protecting their powers and expanding their power through other
means. States have incentives to use force to gain power when offense has the advantage.
This is when most wars happen within the international system. When defense and
offense are almost indistinguishable, it will depend on what side has the slight advantage.
If offense has the slight advantage, the possibility of an arms race increases due to the
high probability of a security dilemma. For offensive realists, the security dilemma makes
war rational and inevitable. When both offense and defense are indistinguishable, but
defense appears to have the slight advantage, an arms race might take place. Defensive
realists argue that defense has the advantage due to natural geopolitical variables, the
morale of the defending citizens, and the cost of offense. National security is enhanced
when no state can dominate the other state. If one state is stronger than others, that state
will seek to dominate the weaker states.
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Currently, the U.S. has the defensive advantage around the globe. However,
Russia is increasing their military capabilities in the Arctic, while the U.S. hasn’t focused
on building icebreakers or northern bases. Putin believes this gives Russia the offensive
advantage in the Arctic region and Eastern Europe (Putin 2014, and Shlapak and Johnson
2016). Putin’s land forces will seek to annex territory and control resources that don’t
initiate a response from NATO or the U.S. like he did in Ukraine and Georgia. An icefree Arctic will allow the normal American Navy to operate, shifting the balance back to
the U.S. “The clearest sign that American exceptionalism has been decreasing is the
aggressive and regional balancing dynamics taking place between states in the Arctic”
(Murray 2012 p. 16). Russia has an incentive to use their military capabilities to increase
their power since they have the regional offensive advantage. Jervis would argue this is
when most wars break out (Jervis 1975). The explanatory framework of realism will
falter in the region if Russia doesn’t use the regional advantage to secure their goals.
Arctic states seem to have found themselves in a security dilemma: if they do not
increase their military, there is a risk that a more powerful actor will try to exploit the
weakness and threaten their regional interests. On the other hand, if they do increase their
military, there is a risk that others may feel intimidated, and increase their capabilities.
The problem is the lack of certainty about each other’s actions (Atland 2014). The way to
mitigate the Arctic security dilemma is Russia and the U.S.’s willingness to consider how
their security moves in the region are perceived and increasing communication and
proper signaling to reduce the risk of miscommunication (Atland 2014).
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Figure 4 Russia’s Arctic Build-up from (Gramer 2017)
Offensive realism is also concerned about a state’s survival, but questions how
much power states want. Mearsheimer argues there are almost never status quo powers
(Mearsheimer 2014). States have incentives to gain power at the expense of other states.
For both China and Russia, becoming the regional hegemon has increased benefits for
their security and economy. Regional hegemony is low risk and high reward since the
U.S. hasn’t focused on the region since the end of the Cold War, and the abundant
economic opportunities offered. Conquest or domination isn’t the goal but does ensure a
state’s survival, so states should always be ready for opportunities to become the
hegemon by increasing their power. Both Russia and China seek to gain power at the
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expense of the U.S. to become the regional hegemon. For both states, a new regional
order would allow stability for development as states focus on increasing their economic
gains, while war would hurt economic prospects.
For Mearsheimer, this makes strategic sense because when a state is in control of
the system, the state can maximize their chance of survival. A state’s power is calculated
by the material capabilities it controls. The balance of power thus reflects the tangible
military capabilities each state possesses. States also have latent power, based on the
socio-economic variables that build military power. States can increase latent power by
increasing their wealth or their population. Both China and Russia seek to increase their
economy using the Arctic, allowing for latent power to increase military capabilities.
Mearsheimer argues, “the structure of the system forces every great power – even
those that would otherwise be satisfied with the status quo to think and act when
appropriate like a revisionist state” (Mearsheimer 2013 p. 74). When the great powers are
content under the current system there is a period of peace. However, it is impossible to
know another state’s future intentions. States must assume the worst or concentrate on
“the strategy of great power politics” (Mearsheimer 2013 p. 75) with absence authority.
“Great power competition, not terrorism, is now the primary focus of U.S. National
Security” stated Secretary of Defense Mattis (Ali 2018).
Mearsheimer argues the attacker has the advantage over the defender, as
empirically, the state that starts the war, generally wins. The behavior of great powers
also is more in accordance with offensive realism rather than defensive realism
(Mearsheimer 2013 p. 77). Conquest sometimes doesn’t pay, and offensive realists argue
that states can be victorious without occupation. The winning state can annex part of the
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routed state, divide the state into two or more states, or disarm and prevent the state from
rearming. With various territorial claims and a weak NATO (Shlapak and Johnson 2016),
Russia has an incentive to annex Arctic territory, bolstering support for a realist
framework.
Defensive realists calculate the difficulty to conquer territory in battle. States with
high levels of nationalism are sometimes impossible to conquer because the citizens
won’t subjugate themselves to the occupying force. Defensive realists argue states should
limit their appetite for power. If not, states risk their own survival since it is difficult to
secure territory, and states will form a balance against the aggressor. However, defensive
realists also argue great powers behave in ways that undermine their power, thus, the
state doesn’t act rationally (Waltz 1979). However, it appears that both the current U.S.
and NATO plans are best explained by defensive realism. This is because the U.S. and
NATO seek an appropriate amount of power in the region to ensure Russia doesn’t feel
insecure and start an Arctic arms race. “Being too aggressive in taking steps to address
anticipated future security risks may create conditions of mistrust and miscommunication
under which risks could materialize” (DOD 2010 p. 13). The U.S. DOD is wary of
spending too much time, money, and effort in the region when there are other high risks
security threats around the globe. However, Europe and the Arctic lack defensive
capabilities that would be able to stop a quick attack by Russian forces (Shlapak and
Johnson 2016) and as before, Russia could make a claim to protect Russian minorities
while inundating a target with disinformation campaigns to quell backlash.
Flake argues that Russia’s military build-up needs a proper historical perspective.
While the increase has been considered a militarization of the region, it is a restoration of
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the Soviet-era force levels and useful to place within Russia’s overall foreign policy
(Flake 2017). The restoration allows Russia to claim sovereignty over its EEZ, protect
their economic interest and retain their image as a great power (Konyshev and Sergunin
2014). Improvements to Russia’s security and constabulary support their economic
interests in developing resources and establishing the Arctic as a viable transit lane,
helping Russia to establish their sphere of influence.
It is yet to be decided whether bipolarity is less war-prone than multipolarity.
Jervis and Ikenberry believe bipolar worlds are less war-prone because there are more
potential advantages for great powers to fight each other in a multipolar world. In a
bipolar world, there is only one power dyad. In a multipolar world, there are three or
more power dyads. Second, in bipolarity, the great powers are more likely to split the
wealth and global population, evenly balancing the principal building blocks of military
power. In multipolarity, the power building blocks might not be evenly distributed.
Bipolarity balancing is more efficient since each power is balancing against each other. In
a multipolarity world, two powers can balance against each other while the third tips the
power to one side or the other. Due to the imbalance, there is greater potential for
miscalculation in multipolarity, increasing the chances of war. During the Cold War, the
Arctic was a bipolar arena, soon, the Arctic will become a multipolar region (Murray
2012) as China seeks regional influence and trade to evolve into a superpower. The key
ratio is having an equal or indistinguishable amount of power between the most powerful
states in the system. If one side has a lopsided amount of power, war is more likely to
break out. Russia and China view each other as strategic partners and have plans for a
Polar Silk Road under the One Road, One Belt initiative, causing a power imbalance,
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leaving the U.S. as the odd state out. For now, the marriage of convenience won’t end in
a divorce because the U.S. is the global hegemon, and both China and Russia are not able
to separately develop the region. China needs energy, while Russia needs foreign
investment, new mining technology, and markets. Once a state becomes sufficient,
interdependence between the two states may exacerbate tension because the more
dependent state may take advantage of the other state’s weakness (Krickovic 2015).
Jervis and Ikenberry would argue the potential power imbalance increases miscalculation
and chance of war. “The world is changing and a number of trends that is challenging the
United States, including the reemergence of great power competition, and not exclusively
from the Russian Federation” (Donilon 2017).
Herz defines the security dilemma as groups or individuals concerned about their
security in the anarchic world. States or individuals attain security to defend themselves
to escape the threat of attack. However, this makes others insecure and compels them to
attain more security, generating a cycle of power competition. None can ever be secure in
a world of competing units and the power accumulation is a vicious circle of security
(Herz 1950). States can increase their military strength but not actually increase their
security at all (Herz 1951). Russia is modernizing their capabilities under the need of
regional surveillance and resumed patrol flights, however, these can be considered as
power projection and a strategic deterrence. Russia’s military build-up might increase the
speed of the spiral in the security dilemma towards conflict. Jervis adds the dilemma is
caused by groups claiming their actions are defensive (Jervis 1976). “We are
strengthening our military infrastructure in the region. Primarily this is done by restoring
a number of airfields beyond the Arctic Circle and the military base on the New Siberian
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Islands. We are optimizing the army groups and naval forces in the area” while
continuing to “invest heavily” in Arctic security (Putin 2014). However, this leads the
U.S. and western states to view Russia as a threat (Gratz 2012), but the U.S. has been
reluctant to focus on the Arctic and has decreased global military capabilities.
Without an Arctic pivot, the U.S. won’t focus on the region, allowing the Arctic
to avoid the security dilemma. However, the U.S. has started to focus on great power
competition with Russia and China (Coats 2018), making an Arctic pivot inevitable. “The
emergence of a multipolar systemic arrangement is very likely to increase security
competition in the system, and the Arctic will be at the epicenter of such conflict”
(Murray 2012 p. 9). Murray argues that the number of great powers in the system
determines how stable or conflictual international politics will be. As the American
hegemony wanes, the shift to multipolarity will increase tension and mistrust, altering
stable Arctic relations (Murray 2012).
Tang believes there should be four more regulators: distance between actors,
asymmetric power, allies or external actors, and the concentration/mixing of ethnic
groups (Tang 2009). The regulators in the Arctic, which are the shortest distance between
Washington and Moscow; the emergence of a multipolar world allowing China to tip the
balance of power; the rise of asymmetric power particularly cyberwarfare; and
information campaigns, add to the Arctic security dilemma. It’s assumed China will ally
with Russia, but other power dyads will leave a state out, tipping power away from the
third wheel. A possible regulator is Russia claiming to protect Arctic indigenous groups
or another group from the U.S./West as it did in Ukraine in 2014 and Georgia in 2008.

39

Arctic states will find themselves in a security dilemma if Russia continues to
militarize the region. If the U.S. and the West do not strengthen their military and
security in the Arctic, there is a risk of Russia trying to exploit their weakness to create a
sphere of influence that threatens Western interests. Alternatively, if the U.S. and the
West strengthen their Arctic military, then Russia might feel insecure and threatened by
the West’s actions, eventually initiating the vicious circle of security (Atland 2014). The
rhetoric and military build-up could produce a self-fulling prophecy, where states
misperceive each other’s actions and intentions (Brigham 2010). “The Russian military
has increased the frequency of its exercises and maneuvers in the region, this quite often
used phrase ‘High North with low tension’ might be replaced with its new version: ‘High
North with growing tension” (Luszcak 2017 p. 49).
Realists acknowledge that international institutions exist, and states operate within
them. Realists argue that when states obey international law it is due to being in the
state’s interest to obey and encouraging other states to obey as well. This explains why
regional agreements are created based on mutual interests such as environmental
protection and search and rescue. States act within international institutions to help
maintain or increase their share of world power, using regional and international
governance when it allows them to coerce other states into action (Thompson 2006).
Institutions are “arenas for acting out power relationships” and using soft power to
achieve the desired outcome (Mearsheimer 1994 p. 13). “States spend significant
amounts of time and effort constructing institutions precisely because they can advance
or impede state goals” (Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001 p.762).
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For states to participate in international institutions, states must calculate their
self-interest based on the distribution of power. Understanding the distribution of power
makes it possible to explain the characteristics of the system and the behavior of states.
As powers rise and fall, the international power structure will emulate the changes.
Russia during the Yeltsin era participated in international institutions as a survival
strategy. However, during the Putin and Medvedev era international institutions are used
to improve Russia’s international image and attractiveness (Joenniemi and Sergunin
2017). Arctic institutions with an absent U.S. allow Russia to act out a power relationship
with regional states to advance Russian goals. Putin and Russia are trying to create a
favorable Arctic system to establish a sphere of influence to maximize their survival.
When the power realities of emerging powers are fulfilled, they historically trump any
legal regimes and treaty structure (Kennan 1972). If the Arctic doesn’t favor Russian
interests based on international law, it appears Putin will use his regional advantage to
secure Russia’s interests, bolstering support for a realist framework.
The Arctic has limited governance because states cooperate when it serves their
interests. However, Mearsheimer argues there is little evidence of institutions changing
state behavior, and it’s especially weak in changing security concerns (Mearsheimer
1994). States fear that their cooperative behavior will be exploited even when they are
under the auspices of an institution (Grieco 1985). Realists argue liberalism has little
value when trying to explain issues that are conflictual when neither side has much to
gain from cooperation (Mearsheimer 1994). Furthermore, Canada boycotted the Arctic
Council meeting in 2014 due to Russian activity in Ukraine. Even though the Arctic has
high participation in intergovernmental and regional organizations, none of the
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governance structures in the Arctic have a framework to deal with military or security
issues (Heininen 2017). “Despite the widespread institutionalization of the Arctic and the
quite effective soft-law regime supporting international cooperation, the region has not
entirely escaped the geopolitical tensions emerging from the competition for
using/controlling navigation routes” (Luszcak 2017 p. 36). Arctic organizations are
actors, but states are still the principal decision makers. Arctic organizations will not have
any significant effect on international outcomes if states remain the main actor (Waltz
1979). If Russia or the U.S. use military capabilities to solve a conflict because
insufficient regional governance could not contain diverging interests, realism will be the
better framework for explaining future Arctic relations.
States cooperate for two reasons: relative-gains considerations, and concerns
about cheating. “The condition of insecurity – at the least, the uncertainty of each about
the other’s future intentions and actions – works against their cooperation… a state
worries about a division of possible gains that may favor other more than itself” (Waltz
1979 p. 105-106). This argument questions how states view relative gains versus absolute
gains. States that seek relative gains are concerned with how much power they have
compared to their enemies and other states. States concerned with relative gains seek the
most power to become the system’s hegemon. States that seek absolute power don’t care
whether other states are gaining power, or how much power if they increase their power.
These types of states are not motivated by the balance of power theory.
Currently, neither Russia nor China has the capital or technology to develop the
Arctic. If Russia and China secure transit routes and resource claims, each state will have
additional resources to increase their military and fund scientific/military research. These
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changes will shift the balance of power closer to Russia and China as their tangible
military capabilities increase. “The most serious wars are fought in order to make one’s
own country militarily stronger, or more often, to prevent another country from becoming
militarily stronger” (Carr 1946 p. 111). The U.S. should prevent the two states from
accessing those resources and routes because they will have the relative-gains advantage
over the U.S.
Executive Order 13685 sanctions Russian energy companies, defense companies
and banks for Russia’s aggressive actions towards Ukraine. Furthermore, the sanctions
suspend foreign investments to any service or technology that supports deep-water
exploration or could produce oil in any maritime area claimed by Russia. Mineral
extraction tax and an oil export duty accounted for forty-six percent of Russia’s tax
revenue in 2014 (Golubkova, Lowe, and Elgood 2016), and increasing energy and oil
sanctions will further impede future growth. The U.S. also placed limited sanctions on
Chinese organizations over North Korea targeting oil exports. New sanctions could be
used to limit Chinese Arctic development. By increasing sanctions on Russia and China,
the U.S. could limit Arctic development by the two states, ensuring their relative-gains
advantage doesn’t shift the balance of power away from America. However, some
Russians will view new or renewed sanctions as a declaration of war (Turak 2018).
Without removing sanctions, Russia and U.S. cooperation will be limited, leaving the
door open for continued Chinese investment and cooperation with Russia.
Security is based on power. Power can be distinguished between potential and
actual power. Potential power is the number of citizens and the level of wealth. A good
economy allows states to build formidable militaries (Carr 1946). The larger a state’s
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population is, the larger the military can be. The state’s army, and the quality of the air
force and navy that support it, measure actual power. Since political control over land is
the main objective of war, land forces are used to gain and control sovereignty over an
area. Because an army can control land, Mearsheimer argues military might is still based
on land power, despite the advent of the nuclear age (Mearsheimer 2014).
“With three great powers – the U.S., Russia and China – involved in the region,
we may soon experience a clash of security cultures from cooperative security to a
strategy of primacy or great power competition” (Lamy 2017 p. 96). The U.S. is already
planning for “long-term strategic competitions with China and Russia” (DOD 2018 p. 4).
The Arctic, however, will just be another geopolitical arena. States seek to protect their
interests and create a sphere of influence without a binding security agreement. Weaker
states in the region have either already joined with the U.S. under NATO’s Article 5 or
are attempting to pass the buck by having good diplomatic relations with both Russia and
the U.S. States will continue to use Arctic institutions if the institution doesn’t impede
their interests or sovereignty, or the state can further their goals. Both Russia and the U.S.
stated they would use unilateral action to protect their sovereignty and interests. States
seek control of the region and resources, so it appears conflict is likely.
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Chapter 3:
Arctic Background and Governance:
Regional cooperation started during the Cold War with the Conservation of Polar
Bears in 1973 by Canada, Denmark, Norway, the U.S.S.R., and the U.S. The treaty
recognized the responsibilities and interests of Arctic states to protect the fauna and flora
of the region (UNEP 1973). However, the science only focused on areas not deemed to
be strategically significant during the Cold War, and furthermore, cooperation was
typically in the form of data exchange rather than collaboration (Johnston 2002). In June
1991, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, the U.S.S.R., and the U.S.
signed the Finnish Initiative to implement environmental protection. However, the
Finnish Initiative was criticized because it lacked direction, ongoing attention, and
financial requirements. The initiative is soft law and lacked any legal authority and
binding action (Young and Osherenko 1993).
The Arctic Council (AC) built on the Finnish Initiative to serve as a forum for
cooperation and coordination among Arctic states and people. The Ottawa Declaration
established the regional organization in September 1996.The AC included the initial
members and added six Permanent Participants, including the Aleut International
Association, the Arctic Athabaskan Council, the Gwich’in Council International, the Inuit
Circumpolar Council, the Russian Arctic Indigenous Peoples of the North, and the Saami
Council. The AC acknowledges indigenous people and wishes to respect their rights and
interests while using the best available traditional and scientific knowledge to mitigate
problems (Tromso Declaration 2009).
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Non-Arctic states have been approved for observer status since the AC formed.
Observer states don’t have voting rights. However, observer status allows states to
propose and participate on projects, attend meetings and partake in discussions, engage
with working groups while being able to make statements and submit documents on
issues discussed. These states include China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, Poland, Singapore, Spain, South Korea, Switzerland, and the United
Kingdom. The AC is the preeminent forum for addressing Arctic regional issues but
remains a soft law institute. Agreements are reached through consensus, ensuring no state
is outvoted or has a policy foisted upon them (Johnston 2002). Furthermore, the AC
deliberately excluded military and security issues.
The Tromso Declaration in 2009 confirmed the rule of law and the Law of the Sea
as a foundational framework for the AC. The Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement
(SAR) became the AC’s first binding agreement. The states entered into an agreement to
cooperate in conducting search and rescue operations after the increase in Arctic
maritime traffic and the harsh conditions posed. The states also recognized the
importance of exchanging information and conducting joint training and exercises (Arctic
Council 2011).
The AC agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and
Response in the Arctic was signed in 2013. The agreement is conscious of oil pollution to
the vulnerable marine environment, and the livelihoods of indigenous and local
communities (Arctic Council 2013). The AC established the Arctic Economic Council in
2014 to foster dialogue between businesses and the organization. The latest AC
agreement is the Task Force on Arctic Marine Cooperation signed in 2015 to “assess
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future needs for a regional seas program or other mechanism, as appropriate, for
increased cooperation in Arctic marine areas” (Arctic Council 2015 p.1). The Council
hopes to implement an ecosystem-based approach for Arctic management that is flexible
in order to meet changing circumstances.
The AC’s strengths are the recommendations and reports on environmental
protection, and transit. However, the AC lacks funding which limits resources and longterm planning, and there are few binding agreements (Finland 2010). “The United States
has worked to make this institution work effectively in areas of low politics issues not
directly related to national security” (Lamy 2017 p. 96).
The Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region (CPAR) is a biennial
parliamentary body composed of delegations from national parliaments, NGOs, and other
government officials of Arctic states, the European Parliament, and indigenous people.
CPAR was originally designed to support the AC in 1994. Now, the Standing Committee
meets a few times a year to discuss current Arctic issues and adopts conference
statements for their biannual goals. CPAR’s current conference statement focuses on
transportation, education, research, human and economic development, and climate
change.
The Arctic Five: Canada, Denmark, Norway, the Russian Federation and the U.S.
adopted the Ilulissat Declaration in May 2008. The declaration called attention to the
international legal framework, UNCLOS, already in place that provides the legal rights
concerning the delineation of the continental shelf; the freedom of navigation; and marine
scientific research for the Arctic. The Arctic Five believed there was no need to create a
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new legal regime to govern the Arctic since there was already a legal foundation in place
(Ilulissat Declaration 2008).
Current boundary and resource disputes are mitigated through UNCLOS.
However, the U.S. has not ratified the convention, although the four other Arctic states
ratified the convention. UNCLOS outlines state limits though EEZs. UNCLOS defines
internal waters, territorial waters, contiguous waters, the exclusive economic zone, and a
continental shelf.
Internal waters are all waterways within a state. States can regulate and use any
resource within their internal waters without following international law. Foreign ships
do not have a right to pass through internal waters without permission. Territorial waters
extend twelve nautical miles from the state’s coastline. The coastal state can set laws,
regulations and use any resources within their territorial waters. Foreign ships have the
right of innocent passage through these waters. Contiguous waters extend twenty-four
nautical miles or another twelve nautical miles from territorial waters. In contiguous
waters, states can enforce laws in four areas: customs, taxation, immigration, and
pollution. EEZs extend 200 nautical miles from a state’s coastline. A state has the sole
exploitation rights over natural resources in their EEZ. States have sovereign rights but
not full sovereignty in EEZs. Foreign states have the freedom of navigation and
overflight. When EEZs overlap, states involved must delineate their maritime boundary
through bilateral/multilateral agreements.
A continental shelf is a natural prolongation of the seabed to the continental
margin edge or 200 nautical miles. If the natural prolongation exceeds the 200-mile limit,
the state can claim a continental shelf which extends 350 nautical miles from the
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coastline. States have resource rights within their continental shelf and have the right to
exclude other states from those resources. However, the classification of a natural
prolongation led to overlapping claims in the Arctic. The UNCLOS rulings and
classifications will be important for states when they start to develop Arctic resources and
might cause tensions between states.
NATO is starting to shift its focus to the Arctic – the first area of concern is
navigation. The need for search and rescue capabilities increases with an estimated
increase in human activity in the region. The second area of concern is natural resources
and NATO’s role in energy security. The third area of concern is territorial claims and the
differences of opinion between the law regarding UNCLOS and the limits of a
continental shelf. The final concern is Arctic states are strengthening their military
capabilities (de Hoop Scheffer 2009).
“NATO provides a forum where four of the Arctic coastal states can
inform, discuss, and share, any concerns...build trust and work towards
cooperation when it comes to these issues. And that includes with Russia. There is
a solid foundation of cooperation, until now, between the Arctic countries.” (de
Hoop Scheffer 2009).
NATO expressed interest in working with Russia on mutual concerns. However,
recent Russian military posture is providing rationale for states to remain in NATO and
providing motivation to increase NATO’s defenses (Haftendorn 2017).
Regional Arctic Cooperative Organizations:
After World War II, the Nordic states wanted a Scandinavian collective defense
alliance to be able to remain neutral and to defend itself if there was another great power
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war. The Scandinavian pact wasn’t finalized due to the Finnish Paasikivi-Kekkonen
policy and the Finno-Soviet Treaty of 1948 which created a mutual assistance pact
between Finland and the U.S.S.R. The Treaty was designed for Finland to resist attacks
by Germany or allies, which included NATO. The idea for a Scandinavian pact failed
when Denmark, Norway, and Iceland joined NATO.
However, Scandinavian states formed the Nordic Council (NC) in 1952 to
promote cooperation between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and the
autonomous regions of the Faroe Islands, Greenland, and the Aland Island. The NC
created a regional labor market, passport-free travel, and focused on public health and
culture. The Council shifted its focus to environmental protection in the Baltic Sea and
the North Atlantic in the 1980s (Nordic Council 2017).
The Nordic Council of Ministers is an institution set up to supplement the Nordic
Council. The members include Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and the
autonomous areas of Greenland, Faroe Islands, and Aland. The Helsinki Treaty regulates
it, and decisions are made by consensus and are binding (Finland 2010).
The Kirkenes Declaration established the Barents Euro-Arctic Region (BEAR) in
1993. The goal of BEAR is to increase cooperation on sustainable economic, social, and
environmental development. BEAR believes cooperation can secure long-term stability
and reduce any tension since the region had strain due to possible military confrontation
during the Cold War. The member states are Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia,
Sweden and the European Commission with representatives from the Saami, Nenets, and
the Vepsian indigenous peoples (BEAR 2017).
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The European Union is an Arctic institution via Denmark, Finland, and Sweden
while Norway and Iceland are members of the European Economic Area. The EU argues
they have rights and obligations to the Arctic under international law (European
Parliament 2014). The EU is concerned about environmental problems, economic
development, and trade routes. The EU stresses climate change will cause unprecedented
security scenarios.
The EU argues climate change will cause conflict over resources and energy
supply, damage to coastal cities and infrastructure, border disputes, environmentallyinduced migration, and situations of fragility and radicalization (European Council High
Representative and the European Commission 2008). In 2008, the EU Parliament
proposed a global Arctic strategy to ensure equal access to natural resources (European
Parliament 2008). However, the EU is also concerned about energy security and their
growing demand for imported oil and gas. Energy sources are coming from fewer states,
and those states have stability issues (EU Commission 2008). “In addition, the increased
accessibility of the enormous hydrocarbon resources in the Arctic region is changing the
geo-strategic dynamics of the region with potential consequences for international
stability and European security interests” (European Council 2008 p.8).
Later in 2008, the EU released another report focused on three objectives:
protecting and preserving the Arctic in unison with its population, promoting the
sustainable use of resources, and contributing to multilateral governance. The EU
believes cooperation with Norway and Russia will foster sustainable development of
resources, and cooperation helps with the observance of environmental protection
(Commission of the European Communities 2008). For Europe, a stable Arctic with
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responsible and sustainable development can create new opportunities for entrepreneurial
activities (Council of the EU 2009). Nevertheless, Javier Solana, the EU High
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, warned in 2008, that
Europeans should prepare for conflict with Russia over energy sources (Alexandrov
2009).
The Northern Dimension (ND) focuses on stability, and sustainable development
through regional cooperation with the EU, Norway, Iceland, and Russia. The U.S. and
Canada are observers to the organization. The European Arctic has intergovernmental
cooperation, as the ND works with the Council of the Baltic Sea States, Barents EuroArctic Council, the Arctic Council, and the Nordic Council of Ministers to achieve
regional goals by working together on joint priority topics, and communication practices
to avoid overlap in services (Northern Dimension 2017).
The six Arctic organizations seek to create regional standards to foster long-term
cooperation through mutual interests. Arctic states have similar interests in SAR,
preventing ecosystem damage, mitigating the effects of climate change, and increasing
economic development. Axelrod and Keohane can best explain how mutual interest in the
region helps regional organizations flourish. States involved in regional organizations
receive an absolute gain. The creation and growth of Arctic governance provides
evidence that the Arctic can adhere to international norms to foster a stable region.
However, a realist would argue states act within Arctic organizations to increase their
share of power and states only cooperate on mutual interests while security issues don’t
have a framework to ensure regional peace.
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Domestic Arctic Policy:
United States:
The U.S. has spent little time developing a foreign and defense strategy for the
circumpolar region and has been reluctant to be an Arctic power (Huebert 2009). The
first U.S. Arctic policy focused on three objectives: natural resources, the recognition of
the fragile environment, and need to better understand the environment (White House
1994).
The U.S. released the National Security Directive (NSPD-66) focusing on the
Arctic region in 2009. The directive explained core national security interests including
missile defense and an early warning system for strategic deterrence, the deployment of
sea and air systems for sea lifts and ensuring freedom of overflight and navigation
especially in the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route.
“The United States has broad and fundamental national security interests in the
Arctic region and is prepared to operate either independently or in conjunction with other
states to safeguard these interests” (White House 2009 p.3). The U.S. seeks peaceful
resolutions of disputes in the area over military conflict. However, the U.S. may exercise
its sovereign right over the natural resources within the American extended continental
shelf and boundary, since energy security is a national interest (White House 2009). The
Navy believes the area is a low-security threat, which will allow states to resolve
problems peacefully. However, the Navy is ready to prevent conflict, and protect national
interests (U.S. Navy 2014). The Arctic is “where we seek to meet our national security
needs” (White House 2013 p. 50).
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With recent Russian violations of sovereignty in Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova,
the Department of Defense (DOD) committed to invest and improve the posture of
American forces to deter and strengthen U.S. capacity to defeat aggression in the Arctic.
The DOD will continue to develop and increase NATO and military alliances while
training in the region to identify strengths and weaknesses of operating in a polar
environment (DOD 2016). However, the DOD cautions of spending too much time,
money and effort in the region with other, high threat risks and austerity. The DOD is
also aware of increasing militarization as “being too aggressive in taking steps to address
anticipated future security risks may create the conditions of mistrust and
miscommunication under which such risks could materialize” (DOD 2010 p. 13).
The U.S. recognizes the unresolved boundary dispute with Canada over the
Beaufort Sea and defines the boundary on equidistance (White House 2009). Canada and
the U.S. are strategic partners and will continue to work together in NATO and NORAD
(North American Aerospace Defense Command) to provide homeland security and
defense. Both states recognize their relationship and common interests they share. The
defense cooperation between the two states is “important to our mutual security interest
in the Arctic”, and the U.S. stresses the “unique and enduring partnership” (US Navy
2014 p. 7). So, it appears the U.S. won’t publicly challenge the boundary dispute.
The U.S. is cautious when engaging with multilateral organizations, and prefers to
act unilaterally, or in a coalition of similarly minded states when it’s in their best interest.
“It is the position of the United States that the Arctic Council should remain a high-level
forum devoted to issues within its current mandate and not be transformed into a formal
international organization particularly one with assessed contributions” (White House
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2009 p. 4). It appears the U.S. is willing to work within Arctic organizations, if it favors
an American agenda, but currently unwilling to grant them more power which might limit
U.S. sovereignty. However, the U.S. supports the principles established by UNCLOS and
wishes to preserve all rights and freedoms of the sea and airspace granted by international
law.
“The Arctic region is the last global frontier and a region with enormous and
growing geostrategic, economic, climate, environment, and national security implications
for the United States and the world,” stated Secretary of State John Kerry (U.S. Embassy
of Norway 2015). America’s Arctic policy is based on defending their national security
and energy interest in the region. Also, America is willing to work with others or within
organizations, if it favors them. However, the U.S. is also willing to use unilateral force
when necessary.
Russia:
“This region has traditionally been a sphere of our special interest. It is a
concentration of practically all aspects of national security – military, political, economic,
technological, environmental and that of resources,” stated Russian President Vladimir
Putin (Putin 2014). Former Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev, stated “the Arctic is
crucial to Russia’s future”, as a strategically significant area. The increased revenue from
developing the Arctic would stimulate the Russian economy. “Our first and main task is
to turn the Arctic into a resource base for Russia in the twenty-first century” (Seattle
Times 2008). The Kremlin has a dual message concerning the Arctic – internationally,
Russia stresses cooperation and peace, while domestically, Russia is signaling a
nationalist message of a resurging great power with revanchist undertones. “Russia seeks
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to maintain the role of a leading Arctic power” (Heininen, Sergunin, and Yarovoy 2014
p. 9).
Russia plans on developing the Arctic as their natural resource base between 2016
through 2020 and develop Northern Sea Route infrastructure (Russian Federation 2009).
Russia would like to increase cooperation in the region through existing international
organizations. Currently, Russian officials believe they can best secure their interests
through cooperation and not conflict (Flake 2017). However, Russia would like to
maintain a favorable operative mechanism in the Arctic for national security and border
protection (Russian Federation 2009).
In 2013, Putin released a new Arctic strategy, acknowledging that numerous goals
from 2009 were not met. Putin planned to reformulate the Arctic strategy since Russia
lacked both the technology to develop natural resources and the foreign capital to invest
in regional projects (Putin 2013). Russia is strengthening itself against new threats and “is
giving rise to opposition from the United States and its allies, who are seeking to retain
their dominance in world affairs” (Russian Federation 2015 p. 3). Russia claims NATO’s
buildup is a threat to their security, and opportunities for global stability are shrinking as
the U.S. deploys their missile defense system.
"It’s crucially important for us to set goals for our national interests in this region,
if we don’t do that, we will lose the battle for resources, which means we’ll also lose in a
big battle for the right to have sovereignty and independence," stated Russian Vice Prime
Minister Dmitry Rogozin (Tharoor 2015). Russia grounded their extended continental
shelf (ECS) claims in international legal precedent and is working within the international
framework to mitigate any possible conflict. The Russian-Norwegian Barents Sea
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agreement, though not finalized, and the Soviet Svalbard Treaty demarcate Russia’s
Arctic territory.
Russian Arctic fleets atrophied after the Cold War since it was no longer a
strategic priority or economically viable. Russia’s northern military improvements since
2008 include restoring air posts, strengthening air and sea defense, and creating two
Arctic brigades under the new Arctic command structure. These upgrades are a
restoration to Soviet-era levels (Flake 2017).
Russia still has an aversion for NATO and finds the alliance's plan to move closer
to the Russian borders as unacceptable. They worry that an ice-free Arctic will open new
sea lines of communication, and America’s emphasis on the freedom of navigation will
attract NATO warships and foreign navies into the Russian EEZ. Russia also perceives a
military and economic imbalance between them vis-a-vis America and NATO. However,
Russia feels they have an escalation and localization dominance in the Arctic region due
to its coastline, icebreaker fleet and military strength in the region. While the overall
power of balance favors NATO and the West, Russia believes the regional balance of
power tilts towards them. Russia is prepared to use its military if its interests are
threatened (Russian Federation 2015).
Russia’s Arctic policy is based on their preference to work within international
organizations and law to further their agenda to “overcome the trauma of the collapse of
the Soviet Union, the fear of becoming a fragmented country, and a failing state (Laruelle
2014 p.254). However, Russia worries about NATO and the West’s power in the region,
and is willing to use force if Russian interests are threatened.
NATO allies:
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Due to NATO’s Article Five for the common defense of every member, the U.S.
could become involved in a conflict over allies’ sovereignty and national security
interests. Stephen Harper made Arctic sovereignty and security part of his election
platform when he ran for Prime Minister in Canada. He proclaimed, “You don’t defend
national sovereignty with flags, cheap election rhetoric or advertising campaigns. You
need forces on the ground, in the sea, and proper surveillance” (Harper 2005). Canada
asserted that the military’s role increased to deter threats and protect the resource-rich
area with the release of the Canada First Defence Strategy.
Denmark believes the threat of a conventional military attack is low. However,
Europe has become less secure with threats of fragile states, and Russia’s actions seek to
undermine the European order. With new threats, Denmark has a need for military
cooperation and to ensure NATO is a deterrent by working to meet their funding
commitment (Denmark 2016). The Thule Air Base in Greenland is an important NATO
military infrastructure in the region.
Currently, Denmark and Russia have overlapping ECS submissions. Denmark
claimed an area that stretches into Russian territory in 2014 while seeking a large EEZ to
grow their economy (Denmark 2011). It is estimated that within Greenland’s EEZ are 31
billion barrels of oil, and it is rich in mineral deposits, including nickel, zinc, gold, and
rare earth elements (Denmark 2011 p. 24). Both Denmark and Russia claim the
Lomonosov Ridge as extending from their own tectonic plates, possibly causing tension
when UNCLOS issues a ruling. Because Denmark is a NATO member, this could be a
reason for the U.S. to become involved in a conflict with Russia as NATO tries to protect
Denmark’s ECS claim or their resources.
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As a state without any military forces, Iceland relies on the U.S. Defense
Agreement of 1951, and NATO for security (Iceland 2011 p. 6). Iceland increase security
and political cooperation with Nordic states and the EU after the U.S. temporary pulled
out their defense capabilities in 2006. Iceland believes the U.S. is still the sole
superpower, but other states are becoming evenly matched. The global balance of power
is changing, and the Arctic region is not an exception (Iceland 2011).
Norway has economic ties to Russia and seeks to maintain cooperation, but
Norway is also a member of NATO. Former Norwegian Foreign Minister proposed a
joint Nordic force in 2009 within the NC to ensure security, allowing navies and air
forces from Denmark, Norway, and Sweden to patrol the region (Alexandrov 2009).
Russia assists Norway with surveillance, border patrol, and sovereignty claims. However,
Norway also participates in NATO exercises to strengthen and integrate capabilities.
Norway recognizes its membership in NATO is the cornerstone of their defense.
However, Russian military operations in the area increased since the 2000s. Norway does
not consider the Russian military build-up as targeting them but is a factor due to its
NATO membership. Norwegian Armed Forces will exercise sovereignty and authority to
protect their interest (NMFA 2017 p. 18). Norway’s alliances might lead them to pick a
side if tensions rise between NATO and Russia in the Arctic or elsewhere around the
globe. It appears Norway would favor Russia in any Arctic conflict due to geopolitical
proximity and close relations with Russia. Norway leaving NATO would undermine the
organization’s mission and increase Russia’s power and legitimacy in the region.
Finland is an Enhanced Opportunities Partner (EOP) in NATO but seeks to
achieve their objectives through intergovernmental cooperation due to their relations with
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other states and indigenous groups. Finland is hedging that Norway and Russia’s energy
development in the Barents area will require Finnish expertise. “Russia’s active
participation in measures contributing to common goals is of special importance for
Finland” (Finland 2010 p.14).
Each coastal state has an interest in protecting their sovereignty and national
security. However, the smaller powers are unable to defend themselves against the great
powers in the region. All states besides Finland and Russia are protected under NATO’s
Article Five. Norway has ties with both Russia and NATO, and if a conflict arose, it
appears Norway would side with Russia. Norway leaving NATO would further Russia’s
goal of undermining Western institutions. Finland would most likely follow Norway into
the Russian sphere of influence due to its ties to both Norway and Russia, and proximity.
Non-Arctic States:
States outside the Arctic seek to increase their influence in the region for access to
transit routes and natural resources. The non-Arctic states that participate in the AC as
observers include China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Poland,
Singapore, Spain, South Korea, and the United Kingdom.
China:
In 2010, Chinese Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo stated the “Arctic belongs to all the
people around the world as no nation has sovereignty over it” (Wright 2011 p. 2). The
Arctic has vital interests for states outside of the region (PRC 2018). A new term “EightState Polar Region Alliance” (Jidi baguo lianmeng) is how China describes the AC,
referring the current situation to that of the “Eight-State Allied Forces” (Baguo Lianjun),
reminiscent of the Boxer Rebellion (Wright 2011). China believes the Antarctic and the
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Arctic involve China’s international rights, and that China should safeguard against any
infringement of those rights and protect the common interest of all states.
China is concerned the Arctic is going to be carved up by western powers to share
the resources and exclude everyone else (Wright 2011). China advocates for a stable
Arctic based on international law to benefit all actors. However, China became a
permanent observer in the AC, strengthening Beijing’s position in the region. Beijing’s
objectives in the north include participating in regional governance, gaining access to
shipping routes and natural resources, and participating in scientific research. China
stresses that all states are granted the freedom to conduct research and the freedom of
navigation in the Arctic (PRC 2018). There are plans for the One Belt, One Road to
expand via the Polar Silk Road allowing China to ship around both the northern and
southern flanks of Eurasia. China supports enhancing security to ensure the safety of
tourists for the emerging Arctic tourism industry and as a source of tourism (PRC 2018).
The non-Arctic state is interested in energy resources as Chinese companies have
deals to explore in Iceland and Greenland. China also has deals with Russia’s Rosneft.
The Sino-Russian partnership is mutually beneficial as China gains a source of oil for
their growing consumption, and Russia receives funding after Western sanctions isolated
them. China sees Russia as a strategic partner (Wright 2011). China seeks a position to
develop Arctic resources and the legal framework to regulate transit routes. China also
wants to study climate change, and the impact the climate will have on the Chinese
environment.
Arctic states’ strategies are to safeguard their sovereignty and secure their share of
resources. China prefers to claim the Arctic as a global commons and seeks to increase
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their participation in regional cooperation (Haftendorn 2011). Each state stated they wish
to protect the environment, increase Arctic governance and conduct research.
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Chapter 4:
Foreign policy analysis:
A foreign policy analysis focuses on how states are self-interested and what
factors such as military capabilities, domestic institutions, economy, and political factions
influence the actions states take (Halliday 2005). A state’s capabilities are defined by the
number of weapons, arms production, soldiers, and trade it has (Heininen 2017). “The
greater a state’s total resources (e.g., population, industrial and military capability and
technological prowess), the greater a potential threat it can pose to others” (Walt 1989 p.
19). The old aim of the U.S. grand strategy is to prevent any single state from controlling
more raw resources than the U.S. controls. This strategy will lead to conflict over oil,
natural gas, and possibly rare earth elements in the Arctic to prevent Russia and China
from having a favorable balance of power.
Security is based on power. Power can be distinguished between potential and
actual power. Potential power is the number of citizens and the level of wealth. A good
economy allows states to build formidable militaries. The larger a state’s population is,
the larger the military can be. Actual power is measured by the state’s army, and the
quality of the air force and navy that support it. Since political control over land is the
main objective of war, land forces are used to control and annex an area (Mearsheimer
2014). Great powers are strong because they control resources allowing them to generate
and maintain power at tactical and strategic levels. A state’s interest and military
capability will allow for a complete understanding of future Arctic international relations.
The People’s Liberation Army has 2.3 million active duty soldiers with another
half a million in reserves drawn from a population of 1.3 billion, while the U.S. has 1.4
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million active duty soldiers drawn from a population of 323 million (Rinehart 2016). The
Russian Armed Forces have 1.9 million active duty soldiers (Pravda 2017) drawn from a
population of 144.3 million (World Bank 2016). The U.S. has the largest military budget
at $587 billion, followed by China with a defense budget of $146 billion (Rinehart 2016),
followed by Russia with a defense budget of $58.9 million (IISS 2017). Altogether,
NATO consists of 2 million soldiers including American troops drawn from the twentynine members. NATO’s defense budget was $892 billion with $265 billion spent by
European members in 2016 (NATO 2017).
The DOD estimates China has a nuclear arsenal of 200-300 warheads. (Rinehart
2016) Due to the new START Treaty going into effect in February 2018, both Russia and
the U.S. are limited to 700 deployed missile carriers divided between ICBMs,
submarines, and bombers, while each state is limited to 1,550 deployed warheads
(Department of State 2010). However, non-deployed missiles don’t count against the
limit.
The three states rank first through third in active duty soldiers and defense budget.
Russia and the U.S. possess the most nuclear weapons, while China has the fourth most
warheads. China and the U.S. have the two largest economies, while Russia hopes to
rebuild their stagnant economy. These factors allow each state to pose a large potential
threat to each other. Every state also has potential power and actual power to maintain
their security and protect their interests.
Arctic security strategies:
Arctic security changed since the Cold War with the growth of regional
governance, the increase in cooperation with indigenous groups and sub-national
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governments, and the increase in relationships between regional and global actors.
However, these factors don’t rule out the militarization of the regional or a future Arctic
conflict. “The geopolitical and strategic importance of the Arctic region is growing, as
symbolized by the planting of a Russian flag on the seabed below the North Pole”
(European Parliament 2008). However, there are two defined but opposing discourses on
Arctic geopolitics. One discourse is based on liberalism, focusing on peace and stability
in the region through institutionalized regional cooperation via the AC, the UN, and other
organizations. The second is the realist perspective, arguing there is a race for natural
resources and economic interests that will produce regional conflicts (Heininen,
Sergunin, and Yarovoy 2014).
The U.S. worries that international institutions would negatively affect its defense
strategies in the Arctic and limit its sovereignty, so the U.S. prefers to work unilaterally
or bilaterally regarding Arctic issues. Russia wants to expand Arctic governance in the
AC while the U.S. views the council as a forum to discuss ideas. The U.S. does not want
to consider the AC as an international organization and give it the power to create
binding resolutions. However, the U.S. supports the growth of NATO and increasing
NATO’s capability in the Arctic (Heininen, Sergunin, and Yarovoy 2014) While security
growth through NATO might empower four of the Arctic states, it will leave Russia
feeling threatened (Huebert 2009). The U.S. is avoiding creating new institutions in the
Arctic that would decrease their global power, thus slowly working through existing
institutions or treaties. States are concerned about the global distribution of power, “the
most powerful states in the system create and shape institutions so that they can maintain
their share of world power, or even increase it” (Mearsheimer, 1994/5 p.13). Institutions
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are places for states to act on power relations, which explains why the U.S. is reluctant to
increase Arctic institutions and wants flexibility for their actions while Russia and China
seek to increase Arctic institutional power.
The Arctic has geopolitical tension because the region has multiple unresolved
territorial conflicts, an ill-defined legal framework, undeveloped energy resources, and
increasing environmental concerns. Russian officials argue the U.S. and NATO have
increased Arctic military and political pressure. Russia is facing four other Arctic states
which are members of NATO making the security configuration unsettling (Flake 2017).
They believe the West is trying to undermine Russia and reduce Russian presence in the
area. Russia is concerned that an ice-free Arctic would allow the U.S. to permanently
deploy a submarine fleet and a sea-based ABM (antiballistic missile) system (U.S. DOD
2013). Huebert argues that despite states downplaying military conflict in the Arctic,
investments in military capabilities between Arctic states increase the competition, thus
possibly creating an Arctic arms race (Huebert 2010). “The longer there is an ad-hoc
approach to Arctic security, the greater the risk of misunderstandings,
miscommunications and accidents in this dark, ice-covered and hostile region” (Conley
2011).
“Current Russian policies in the Arctic are explained by Moscow’s pragmatic
interests such as competition for natural resources and/or control of northern sea routes”
(Heininen, Sergunin, and Yarovoy 2014 p.4). Russia recognizes a need to increase their
northern military capacity to meet existing and predictable threats as well as protect their
sovereignty claims. Russia, however, will take a dual approach by also working to
“improve the legal framework in the area of developing the foundations of governance of
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the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation” (Putin 2013 IV:24). Russia will use both
diplomacy/international law and military force when it suits their needs. Moscow
represents an amalgamation of Soviet/Peter the Great Russian revisionism, soft power,
and using international law in its favor. Russia will seek international cooperation to
develop the Arctic, rather than take unilateral military action while they are rebuilding
their economy and military.
The Bering Strait will become strategically important as a chokepoint for vessels.
The Strait allows Russia to connect Asia and Europe and will serve as an important route
for trade (U.S. Navy 2014). The U.S.S.R. in 1990 declared the Northern Sea Route is
situated between inland waters and their EEZ, and thus could regulate navigation to
ensure safety and to prevent environmental problems. Vessels seeking to travel the route
must request a travel permit and an icebreaker for guidance (U.S.S.R. Minister of
Merchant Marine 1990). The regulations increased as hydrometeorological and ice
condition services were added in 2016. Both laws stress regulations that are pertinent to
safe navigation in the harsh region. However, the U.S. Navy maritime strategy identifies
the freedom of navigation as the top U.S. national priority and rejects Russia’s claim of
the passage. The preservation of the rights of Arctic navigation and overflight allows the
Navy to exercise these rights throughout the world (Titley and St. Johns 2010 p. 42) and
could be a possible point of tension.
Canada is building a military base on the Northwest Passage to protect their
sovereignty in the Arctic. However, Canada does not have the forces to defend against a
large-scale conflict and rather relies on the U.S. for defense. Canada and Russia have a
history of bilateral cooperation dating back to 1992. Together, the two nations cooperate
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on soft security threats like climate change and pollution, maritime safety, illegal
migration, organized crime, and terrorism. However, security cooperation ceased to exist
due to the Ukrainian conflict. Increasing tensions in Ukraine could spill over to the Arctic
region between the two states (Heininen, Sergunin, and Yarovoy 2014).
Putin agrees that the U.S. is the current dominant power controlling the status
quo. However, Putin argues once another great power emerges, the balance of power is
ruined. Putin advocated for challenging the U.S. and the West to reduce their dominance
of international affairs (Russian Federation 2015). From the Russian perspective, a new
balance of power is better, while it would be worse for the U.S. and other NATO allies.
NATO believes it has striven to foster cooperation with Russia through the NATO-Russia
Founding Act and other international organizations. Russia, however, violated its
commitments and international law. NATO does not want conflict with Russia but will
not let Russia violate the principles and security of the alliance (NATO 2014). Norway’s
Joint Military Headquarters Commander, Rune Jakobsen stated, “We are not in a conflict
with Russia, and we have never had a border dispute with them in 1,000 years, but after
Ukraine, we changed our posture.” Russia is developing new military capabilities, and if
Norway leaves a vacuum, Russia will fill it (Wintour 2017). Furthermore, Russia is
actively challenging Western dominance by driving wedges between institutions and
populations, while creating doubt about those institutions.
Chinese interest can be understood by the deficit of domestic energy resources
and the abundance of natural resources in the Arctic. China, the top global exporter, is
interested in shorter transit routes that avoid the Singapore Strait, the Strait of Malacca,
the Horn of Africa, and the Suez Canal. Both the Northwest Passage and the Northern
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Sea Route are about half the distance between Asian exporters and Western European
ports compared to current routes. These passages also hold geopolitical and strategic
importance for global navies.
An ice-free Arctic would continue Russia and China’s recent cooperation. Within
the last decade, the two states traded energy and weapons; conducted a joint-naval
exercise in the Baltic Sea; held a summit in Moscow; and signed a roadmap for military
cooperation (Wu 2018), while Beijing didn’t expel Russian diplomats after the UK nerve
agent attack (Westcott 2018). Historically, the two states tend to vote in tandem and hold
veto power in the UN Security Council. Also, Russia is currently the highest recipient of
Chinese foreign aid between 2000 and 2014 (Taylor 2017). China was the largest
importer of Russian arms between 1999 and 2006, and they resumed weapon trade in
2015 (Wezeman 2017).
The two view each other as strategic partners, while Chinese Foreign Minister
Wang Yi stated, “Relations were at the best level in history” ahead of Putin’s visit to
Beijing (Westcott 2018). China would be able to export goods to Europe via a faster,
safer region that Russia would patrol. China would also be able to increase the import of
Russian energy after developing regional infrastructure. “China seems to see the overall
effect of Arctic climate change as more of a beckoning economic opportunity than a
looming environmental crisis” (Wright 2013 p.1). Under this scenario, China would have
the relative gain over the U.S. and thus the Chinese would be able to increase Russia’s
gains, possibly allowing Russia to have the relative gain advantage over the U.S. Unless
the U.S. can keep China out of the Arctic, China will have the relative gain advantage,
leaving the U.S. at a disadvantage.
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Russia and China both seek energy security for economic development. Krasner
argues that American national interests shape energy policy. The U.S. has three clear
goals in shaping their claim to natural resources: develop policies to maximize the
competitive structure of the global market and thus keep the prices of key commodities
low; increase the security of supplies of critical natural resources on which the U.S.
depends on for economic and political security and stability; and implement policies that
help secure more general foreign and security policy objectives (Krasner 1979 p. 331).
Due to the three American goals, Russia’s and China’s need for energy will cause tension
between the three states. Energy security is strategic, and the more credible options a
state has, the more power it wields (Heininen 2017). Norway and Russia together
provided around seventy percent of petrol, and fifty percent of the oil imported into
Europe. Russia supplies about twenty-five percent of imported coal as well (Finland
2010). Due to these factors, the EU seeks cooperation with Norway and hopes that they
become a member. This leaves the U.S. to worry about European energy security.
“What matters most is the number of great powers and how much power each
control.” If the power ratios between the great powers are not lopsided, the chance of
military conflict is low (Mearsheimer 2014 p. 337). However, once China starts to
expand to the Arctic, China will become the tipping point creating a multipolar Arctic.
Each state in the Arctic has their own security and economic interests. However,
the militarization of the Arctic is low, which gives time for states to work on their
interests without the threat of military conflict.
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Chapter 5:
Two theories in Arctic relations:
Liberalism:
The development of natural resources reinforces Arctic governance because
Russia and others have more to lose economically if they go to war (Brigham 2011 and
Staun 2017). There is an important role for international agreements like UNCLOS and
international organizations like UNCLCS and the AC to mitigate conflict, especially for
the development of energy resources and transit networks (Wang 2012). Arctic
institutions have greatly increased since the end of the Cold War, creating an order and
hierarchical structure through frameworks and norms. These institutions bring states
together to cooperate on issues such as environmental protection, search and rescue, and
economic development. Other forms of Arctic governance created a regional labor
market with passport-free travel, increased public health and education, and raised
awareness for indigenous culture while securing long-term stability.
It is beneficial for all states to follow the norms and standards to foster stability in
the Arctic. By growing governance, Arctic shipping routes can be safely used, while
resources are developed in a sustainable fashion. The reduced transaction costs will
increase sharing of information, helping to mitigate the fear of defection.
All states in the Arctic have a common interest in economic development and
environmental protection, thus increasing cooperation in those areas (Axelrod and
Keohane 1985). Even rivals during the Cold War recognized the need for protecting the
ecosystem by signing the Conservation of Polar Bears in 1973, the Finnish Initiative in
1991, and the Tromso Declaration in 2009. When states benefit from cooperation, states
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will form institutions to normalize the relation (Keohane and Martin 1995) fostering
interdependence (Lipson 1984). States and actors started this process after World War II
but made little progress during the Cold War. Regional governance increased since the
1990s, but still only has two binding treaties. Due to the lack of binding treaties, and the
absence of security issues discussed, the AC was able to operate normally during and
after the Ukrainian Crisis (Byers 2017). Exner-Pirot argues that states should use the
opportunity after SAR to increase cooperation to reduce the possibility of
miscommunication (Exner-Pirot 2012).
Stokke argues that knowledge-building and capacity serve the AC and regional
institutions well, while norm-building and rule enforcement is dealt with more effectively
by other institutions (IMO or UNCLOS), but regional organizations can add support.
Furthermore, the AC has obtained results between the West and Russia because
knowledge-building is considered non-controversial (Stokke 2012). Post-Cold War
region governance focuses on mutual interests and opportunities (Byers 2017).
Every state policy recognizes the need for environmental protection. The states
are willing to cooperate with scientific research to mitigate the problem. Organizations
and regimes can build on already established mutual interests to continue to foster
interdependence to normalize regional relations. The establishment of the Arctic
Economic Council in 2014 will help foster private-public partnerships and bring in
regional investment to strengthen Arctic stability. Regional regimes and institutions will
reinforce reciprocity, making defection costly for actors and decreases future economic
gains. Flake argues the increase in regional governance, and Russia’s willingness to be
diplomatic by signing search and rescue agreements, pollution agreements, and oil-spill
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agreements help support Russia’s strategic economic interests (Flake 2017). Russia also
actively worked to peacefully resolve border disputes to free up administrative capacity
to focus on other issues (Moe et al. 2011) If states can continue to build on linked
agreements the regional governance structure will foster complex interdependence to
reduce the possibility of conflict. The U.S. and Russia will also have to resolve the easy
disputes (Flake 2017) to stop a spillover effect in the Arctic. Those easy disputes of
Syria, Ukraine, and the Lomonosov Ridge are easier talked about than settled as each has
geopolitical and economic consequences.
The U.S. has supported bilateral and multilateral agreements with other states
described as “architecture without building” (James and James 2014 p. 200). Canada and
the U.S. signed the Arctic Cooperation Agreement of 1988. The U.S. wouldn’t recognize
Canadian sovereignty claims, but the U.S. would still ask Canada for permission before
transit. The U.S. also established NORAD and the Tri-Command Framework with
Canada to coordinate security between the states (James and James 2014). Regional
complex interdependence also increased with fisheries management agreements, arms
treaties, created “epistemic communities of professions” through research collaboration,
and infrastructure investment by domestic and foreign sources, adding support to Young
and his multiple agreements to increase regional governance.
The dynamics of Arctic politics could change with Trump’s Russian connections.
This might allow Russia and the U.S. to seek better relations around the globe and in the
Arctic due to mutual interests. Trump’s appointment of Rex Tillerson to the State
Department could also strengthen ties and bolster liberalism. Before becoming Secretary
of State, Tillerson was the CEO of ExxonMobil, and the Director of Exxon Neftegas, a
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joint venture between ExxonMobil, Russia, Japan, and India. Tillerson organized deals
with Rosneft to develop shale oil in Russia during 2011. He met with Putin and Igor
Sechin, Rosneft’s CEO and close friend of Putin, several times to develop a working
relationship. Tillerson was awarded Russia’s Order of Friendship for his oil deals in
2013. Recently, Trump’s budget called for initiating energy development in the Arctic
National Wildlife Refuge to strengthen America’s energy security (Office of
Management and Budget 2018).
Trump/Tillerson and Putin/Russia share interests, and the likelihood of
cooperation goes up when states have mutual interests. This interest is increasing
business for ExxonMobil and Rosneft while increasing tax revenue for America and
Russia. If the U.S. and Russia start to cooperate, a liberal framework would best explain
the Arctic, as states would seek a stable region. The two states could forge ahead with oil
deals and other joint ventures that eventually leads to low-level politics. A stable,
conflict-free Arctic would allow industry and enterprise to flourish. From low-level
politics, the states could work on high-level politics and eventually security and military
issues. However, before a liberal framework can best explain the region, the U.S. would
have to remove all sanctions from Russia and Russian officials. The removal of sanctions
is unlikely to happen, even with Trump as president. The sanctions have opened the door
for Chinese investment and cooperation.
Staun argues that Russia’s Arctic power is more in line with a status quo power
than a revisionist power. “Paradoxically, Russia has followed the rules of the game in the
Arctic – while at the same time breaking the rules of the game in Ukraine” (Staun 2017 p.
314). Russia is a critical supporter of the AC and BEAR while strictly adhering to the
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Ilulissat Declaration and UNCLOS in the region without threatening Arctic neighbors
(Staun 2017). Russia is not pursuing “the Soviet maximalist demands of past times”
(Staun 2014 p. 323). If Russia seeks to be the regional hegemon, setting up a sphere of
influence would increase their economic gains while having influence over regional
organizations to legitimize Russia’s foreign policy goals. Once either China or Russia is
the regional hegemon, how long will the marriage of convenience last? If complex
interdependence is strong enough the divorce is unlikely to happen allowing the region to
remain stable.
However, not all forms of Arctic governance will be welcomed. Russia will
oppose most forms of NATO and EU expansion as “encroachment into what they
consider their traditional sphere of influence” (Flake 2017 p. 23). NATO stated they plan
to increase search and rescue operations to ensure safe navigation while protecting
territorial claims and providing energy security for Europe. Russia views NATO in the
region as a threat to its interests because the West will try to internationalize the Northern
Sea Route (Flake 2017). NATO’s Cold Response exercise worried Russia because they
believed the drill was aimed at them. In the exercise, Norland, a large nondemocratic
state, claimed an oil deposit within the territorial waters of Midland, a small democratic
state. NATO then comes to the aid of Midland and helps win the war (Konyshev and
Sergunin 2012)
Moscow believes NATO’s new mission is securing resources around the globe
(Konyshev and Sergunin 2014). Russia is opposed to an increase in these forms of
governance and past western expansion to Georgia and Ukraine has led to conflict.
Russia would most likely favor increasing NATO relations through expanding the
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Partnership for Peace, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, and the NATO-Russia
Council. Putin told Oliver Stone he considered the option of having Russia join NATO
when Clinton was president (Russia Today 2017).
Despite Ukraine, in which sanctions stopped economic cooperation between
Russia and the West, Arctic relations continued their normal path of cooperation. (Byers
2017). Some cooperation is due to states’ interests, but complex interdependence explains
the long-term cooperation, and how it can reduce tension during a crisis (Byers 2017).
The Arctic has seen forum shopping before with the Arctic Five negotiating a fishing
agreement rather than in the Arctic Council. However, if states in the future use different
organizations to legitimize a policy because it is favorable to a certain policy or another
could cause tension. Some states would argue they were left out, such as when China
claimed the region as a global common or in the Arctic Five case.
Liberalism is increasing as states recognize indigenous groups. States are
increasing the responsibility of regional organizations, private entities are investing in the
region, and states believe they can’t end the threat of climate change by themselves.
However, liberalism can also produce conflict in the region. The growth of the EU and
NATO will create tension, while it is possible that Russia and China will seek influence
in regional governance structures that favor their interests, possibly creating a new
regional order. Governance will continue to grow at all levels fostering stability and
maybe creating tension while cooperation on environmental problems and search and
rescue increases. Every state in the region will receive a relative gain for being included
in Arctic governance; however, the gains won’t be equal.
Realism:
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One great power and a former superpower seek a sphere of influence, attempting
to shift the regional and global balance of power away from the status quo causing
clashes of interest. Lacking binding Arctic governance, the region is anarchic, leading
states to struggle for power. Russia is strengthening itself to give rise to “opposition from
the U.S. and its allies, who are seeking to retain their dominance” (Russian Federation
2015 p. 3). China and Russia want an Arctic that favors their balance of power by
creating a new regional order, while the U.S. is an empire reluctant to cede its global
hegemon. This will return the Arctic to a geopolitical arena for great power competition.
“There is a growing concern that due to this situation the current era of high political
stability of the Arctic may be lost” (Heininen 2017 p. 5).
States will try to take advantage of each other in the Arctic to ensure better gains
based on the regional structure. Russia stated they want the Arctic based on international
law because they have influence in smaller organizations. This helps Russia grow their
political power in ways that won’t challenge American power. Without strong, binding
agreements and institutions, Arctic governance is explained by the regional structure that
helps increase actors’ power. “The IR-liberalist discourse is not inherently stable, even if
it is rather institutionalized and sedimented and the IR-liberalist side can claim strong,
economic interests in the region… However, concerns for national security could lessen
the importance of these interests, thus undermining the stability of the IR-liberalist
discourse” (Staun 2014 p. 328). Also, it appears that Russia would be willing to take
military action if the regional order and international law don’t favor their goals.
The current structure is based on the global balance of power, and how the U.S. is
opposed to ceding power to organizations that might limit future actions. “It is the
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position of the United States that the Arctic Council should remain a high-level forum
devoted to issues within its current mandate and not be transformed into a formal
international organization particularly one with assessed contributions” (White House
2009 p. 4). The U.S. has limits on its regional cooperation, which “coincide at the point
where regional interests and American interests diverge” (Sharp 2011 p.307). Due to
America’s unwillingness to increase Arctic governance, the region has two binding
treaties, and the AC doesn’t discuss military or security issues. There are no transit route
agreements and territorial claims overlap. Once conflict happens, as shown when Canada
pulled out of the AC over Ukraine, Arctic institutions won’t be able to stop or change
state behavior. A liberal framework will be unable to explain the region until a new
regional/world order is established.
Russia will target places the West is reluctant to spend resources and manpower
on while China seeks to expand their trade network via the One Belt, One Road initiative.
China would have the relative gain advantage over every state if allowed to keep
expanding in the Arctic. China invested $90 billion (Grady 2018) and underwrote
development for regional seaports, mining and energy companies, pipelines, and
infrastructure such as airports, railways and roads in Russia, Iceland, Greenland, Finland,
and Norway. Some of the Chinese regional expansion is under the Arctic component of
the $1 trillion One Belt, One Road initiative attempting to link Asia, Europe, and Africa
along transport and logistics networks (Dillow 2018).
If the U.S. wants to keep their global hegemony, the U.S. will work to effectively
impede Chinese gains in the region, creating economic and possibly military tension with
China and Russia. Russia, currently, is unable to grow without Chinese assistance after
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years of a stagnate economy. If the U.S. is unable to impede China, both China and
Russia would be able to increase their economies to grow their militaries while
continuing to invest in the region. The U.S. seeks to maintain a favorable global balance
of power, but this would harm America’s security and economic interests in the region
and around the globe (DOD 2018). If the U.S. remains uninterested in the Arctic, Russia
and China would be able to create a regional order based on international law, and the
realist explanatory framework would not be useful for the Arctic until and if the marriage
of convenience ends.
Ten percent of the Arctic has multiple claims, leading states to compete for land,
resources, and transit routes that could spark another conflict or impose on smaller
powers as “Russia continues to seek to redraw international borders by force” (Chan
2017). Russia will also use UNCLOS since they believe they have both the law and
evidence to legally claim about half of the Arctic seabed. Russia also has an interest in
ensuring other states back UNCLOS to legitimatize the Russian EEZ (Staun 2014). The
American need for freedom of seas, and not ratifying UNCLOS, signals the U.S. is more
isolationist than others in the region (Sharp 2011). However, if UNCLOS rules the
Lomonosov Ridge in favor of America, Canada, or Denmark, the resource-rich area
could spark a regional conflict.
However, China also seeks to protect its international rights in the Arctic and will
safeguard against any infringement of those rights and protect the common interest of all
states (PRC 2018). China believes the Arctic will be carved up by western powers and
exclude everyone else.
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Russia will seek opportunities to control territory in the Arctic much like they
have in the past with Ukraine and Georgia. Russia will go after small and slow
accumulation of power in areas that won’t trigger a casus belli response by America or
NATO, in what Russia calls “an open, rational, and pragmatic foreign policy ruling out
costly confrontation” (Russian Federation 2015 p. 6). The failure by the West to respond
to Russian policies in Ukraine encourages Russian aggression in the region (Krickovic
2015).
Russia claims the Northern Sea Route as internal waters, thus giving them
jurisdiction to protect Chinese shipping vessels, while the U.S. seeks to preserve all rights
and freedoms of the sea and airspace. “The Arctic is key strategic terrain. Russia is taking
aggressive steps to increase its presence there,” stated Secretary of Defense Mattis
(Gramer 2017). China seeks secure transit routes to expand a global trade network around
sixty countries that will rival the American centered trade agreements. Allowing Russian
sovereignty over the area permits Russia and China to foster economic development in
the Arctic through the Polar Silk Road. The Arctic economic network is a piece of the
Chinese plan to shift the global economy to its favor, and there might be tension if NATO
or the U.S. tries to impede their Arctic economic growth. Wright argued whoever
controls the Arctic transit routes will control the world economy, which will benefit
revisionist states like Russia and China (Wright 2011).
Krasner argues that governments must protect certain industries in the interest of
their national security. The U.S. grand strategy is to prevent any single state from
controlling more raw resources than America controls. “Just as economic interests would
induce government to intervene on behalf of business, alleged business interests would be
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used by governments as a pretext for power politics” (Herz 1950 p. 176). For both Russia
and the United States, oil is a pillar of their economy and accounts for most of Russia’s
tax money. Russia will be able to develop resources to grow their economy and
strengthen their military while providing transit security for China in the open Arctic.
While Russia is weaker, the U.S. should limit Russia’s Arctic development, try to
stagnant their economy through sanctions, and limit Russian trade. The sanctions against
Russia by the U.S., the EU and Norway target security and energy projects in the Arctic
and should expand if necessary (Luszczuk 2017). The U.S. can take the moral position
while maintaining their military force by sanctioning and impeding the Russian economy.
However, new or renewed sanctions might be considered a “declaration of war” by some
Russians (Turak 2018).
While the U.S. has the defensive advantage around the globe, Russia currently has
the offensive and defensive advantage in the Arctic. Russia will work to secure areas that
won’t trigger a nuclear showdown with the West, much like Russia has in the past with
Ukraine and Georgia. Russia has an incentive to use military force to increase power
since they have the regional offensive advantage. Jervis argues this is when most wars
happen. If Russia uses their regional military advantage to further their goals because
Russian interests were not secured through regional organizations and international law,
it would allow for a better realist explanation of the region.
The American Arctic defensive capabilities consist of two icebreakers, two bases,
three airfields, and forty-one nuclear submarines capable of surfacing from under ice.
With the exception of the submarines, U.S. forces lag behind Russian Arctic capabilities.
The U.S. also lacks an Arctic deep-water port. However, the 2018 defense budget
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authorized six new icebreakers with the first one expected in 2023. Russia has forty-one
icebreakers with eleven under construction, three bases, eighteen airfields, nine navy
bases, and twenty-five submarines capable of surfacing from under the ice. The U.S.
Navy and Air Force far outnumber the Russian counterparts, but the U.S. doesn’t have
equipment suitable for the harsh conditions, giving Russia the regional advantage
(Russian Federation 2015). Even without conflict, this regional advantage gives Russia
security leverage, which China will find useful to protect their Polar Silk Road. Putin
stated, “This region has traditionally been a sphere of our special interest” (Putin 2014).
Russia and China have the perfect opportunity to exploit American overreach because the
U.S. is wary of spending too much time and effort in the Arctic region when there are
other, more pressing security risks around the globe (DOD 2010).
The U.S. Navy is ready to protect the national interests and prevent conflict in the
region either independently or in conjunction with other states (U.S. Navy 2014 and
White House 2009). America seeks peaceful resolutions of disputes but will use force
when necessary. Russia is prepared to use its military if its interests are threatened
(Russian Federation 2015). The DOD is committed to invest and improve American
forces to deter aggression in the Arctic (DOD 2016). The DOD is cautious because
“being too aggressive in taking steps to address anticipated future security risks may
create the conditions of mistrust and miscommunication under which such risks could
materialize” (DOD 2010 p. 13). If the U.S. conducts an Arctic military build-up, this
opens the possibility for a regional arms race as Russia might feel threatened by the
increased American capabilities. Thus, the security dilemma starts to spiral as each side
seeks to increase their military capabilities but do not actually increase their security.
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Russia is against any ballistic missile defense system operating in the Arctic and is
working to match any American capabilities. Atland describes this as “action-reaction
dynamics” that may lead to an unintended security dilemma increase. Part of the
communication problem is Arctic states don’t have a forum to discuss security issues
(Atland 2014), and Russia and NATO members lack trust in each other. The security
dilemma will spiral if the U.S. pivots to the region, however, the Arctic is not the focus of
U.S. foreign policy, keeping the chance of a security dilemma low.
NATO currently doesn’t have a large role in the region. However, based on de
Hoop Scheffer, when the Arctic melts, NATO will protect energy sources and territory
while providing search and recsue services. NATO does not want conflict but will not
tolerate Russian violations of international law. Russia is already wary of NATO
expansion, and most forms of NATO Arctic enlargement will trigger a Russian reaction.
After being invaded numerous times, Russia seeks natural barriers to buffer any future
Napoleons or Hitlers. Sharp argues NATO will take a secondary role in the Arctic,
“based on the conclusion that a more direct role in Arctic security will be met with
Russian resistance,” which will decrease security (Sharp 2011 p. 314).
Tillerson reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to Europe and to ending the Ukrainian
crisis before he was fired. The crisis “made clear how energy supplies can be wielded as
a political weapon. Enhancing European energy security by ensuring access to affordable,
reliable, diverse, and secure supplies of energy is fundamental to national security
objectives” (Tillerson 2017). The U.S. will work to ensure no state can extort energy
from the EU. Tillerson stated the U.S. seeks positive relations with Russia, “however,
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Russia has shown it seeks to define a new post-Soviet global balance of power, one in
which Russia...seeks to impose its will on others by force” (Tillerson 2017).
With China, Russia and the U.S. staking claims in the Arctic, it appears the region
will transform from a bipolar Arctic to a multipolar Arctic. The U.S. has the better global
force, but Russia argues they have a regional advantage due to the amount of Russian
Arctic coast and their militarization. Since China and Russia view each other as strategic
partners and have plans for the Polar Silk Road, a potential power imbalance will leave
the U.S. as the odd state out. Most wars break out when there is a lopsided balance of
power.
“With three great powers – the U.S. Russia and China – involved in the region,
we may soon experience a clash of security cultures from cooperative security to a
strategy of primacy or great power competition” (Lamy 2017 p. 96). Other states such as
Iceland, India, and Japan believe the Arctic will become a point of tension over great
power’s interests as well. With the lack of a higher authority, states will eventually go to
war over differences in their interests. The weaker states within the Arctic have either
already bandwagoned with the U.S. under NATO or are attempting to pass the buck by
having good diplomatic relations with both Russia and the U.S. The three great powers in
the system will seek to maximize their power in the region but won’t seek a global
hegemon since triggering a total war would limit each powers’ chance of survival.
Realism is based on survival, both Russia and China seek an appropriate amount of
power for either their own Arctic or Eurasian spheres of influence that will increase their
chance of survival.
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Currently, it seems like liberalism would best describe Arctic international
relations. This is because regional governance based on mutual interests increased
significantly since the end of the Cold War. However, the stakes were low since
development was near impossible and extremely costly. Also, regional governance tends
to either be the focus of Russia or the U.S., while leaving the other great power outside
the governance structure. Second, some states don’t want Arctic governance to focus on
security issues because they do not want to limit their sovereignty in the region. The U.S.
seeks to contain any regional governance that might infringe on their actions and is
against any transformation of the Arctic Council’s mandate. Third, the U.S. and Russia
will most likely not be able to solve the “easy disputes” of Syria, Ukraine, and border
issues. Forth, the U.S. is unlikely to end sanctions on Russia, further impeding any Arctic
cooperation between the two states. Finally, the Arctic has no framework or lacks a
strong enough collective security to stop a large power from partaking in unilateral action
when its interests are challenged. These reasons are why a liberal framework will be
unable to explain the region. Arctic states will assume the worst-case scenarios that don’t
necessarily reflect current international relations because they are uncertain of each
other’s intentions, and “choose to play it safe” (Atland 2014 p.152).
Arctic development is becoming cheaper and the focus of Russian foreign policy.
Russia and the U.S. stated they are willing to use force when necessary to defend their
interests outside of any Arctic governance. UNCLOS is a recognized framework for
sovereignty disputes, but the legal and technical ambiguities are an insufficient
mechanism for dispute resolution. States will need goodwill and a forum, such as the AC,
to mitigate issues (Sharp 2011). When interests clash between Russia, China, and the
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U.S., tensions will rise. It appears realism will offer a better explanation since great
powers will ignore Arctic norms and international laws based on liberal theory.
Russian northern forces atrophied before Putin sought a sphere of influence in
2008, while the U.S. has been reluctant to focus on the Arctic because they have other
issues around the globe. This gives Russia a regional advantage over any Western
military. However, the DOD committed to invest and improve American forces to deter
aggression in the Arctic (DOD 2016). Putin and Russia will negatively view any U.S. or
NATO militarization of the region, possibly triggering an arms race. The DOD cautions
against spending too much time, money and effort in the region with other, high threat
risks and austerity (DOD 2010), possibly allowing the U.S. to escape from the security
dilemma. However, this leads the U.S. to underestimate Putin’s desire for a sphere of
influence.
Another possibility is Russia will argue they are protecting Russian minorities to
occupy areas that don’t trigger a NATO reaction. With various agreements and claims on
Arctic territory, Russia might try to annex a NATO member’s territorial claim.
Depending on the reaction by NATO members to invoke Arctic Five, which without any
deaths, the slow decision-making structure with the lack of political will and defense
expenditure cuts, leaves NATO members to most likely debate the issue without any
action (Eyal 2014). “As presently postured, NATO cannot successfully defend the
territory of its most exposed members” (Shlapak and Johnson 2016 p. 6). This gives
Russia an incentive to increase their size while being able to use Peter the Great and
Soviet historical claims of returning Russia to superpower imperial status.
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Shlapak and Johnson, and NATO General Shirreff argued Russia can ignore the
norms of territorial aggression due to inadequate NATO defense (Shirreff 2016). If
Russia claimed territory in either the Baltic or the Arctic, Moscow would quickly annex
the land into the Russian Federation. NATO would either have to accept the occupation
or launch a counter-offensive that might develop into a nuclear war, both bad options for
the West (Shlapak and Johnson 2016). If the U.S. accepted occupation, a new Russian
sphere of influence would be created and another Berlin-like wall or ship patrols would
possibly be used to fortify the new border. This would legitimize the new Russian
regional order. Depending on whether or not the collective defense agreement failed to
protect another member’s sovereignty, this could allow Russia to sow seeds to undermine
NATO. However, like other Russian Arctic regulations, the U.S. will probably reject any
new claims, arguing Russia is acting beyond its territorial waters. The U.S. in NSPD-66
ensured the freedom of navigation and U.S. interests in the Northern Sea Route (U.S.
Navy 2014). The U.S. may exercise their sovereign rights in the Arctic to protect natural
resources since energy is a national interest (White House 2009). This worries Russia, as
they are concerned an ice-free Arctic will allow Western warships with missile systems
to travel into their EEZ (Russian Federation 2015). However, Russia argues they have the
localization dominance due to their coastline, icebreaker fleet and military strength in the
region.
Since the end of World War II, states have either jockeyed for power and position
within various international organizations or tried to limit the expansion of those
organizations to ensure more unilateral actions if necessary. States will use international
organizations like UNCLOS and Arctic Five to try to legally exclude other states from
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developing resources while ensuring their future economy won’t be impeded by
regulations or other states. Once Russia establishes a boundary and favorable regional
governance, they will secure the area to protect Chinese trade.
Realism will best describe Arctic relations when development costs become
cheaper and transit safer due to the lack of ice. “The tectonic shifts that are happening are
the rise of a powerful China… and the resurgence of a weak, but very dangerous, and
well-armed Russia, so the return of a period of great power competition is happening”
(Flournoy 2017). Also, the U.S. is “guided by a return to principled realism” (White
House 2017). The risk of interstate war is increasing, and the Arctic is not immune to
energy security and geopolitics (Coats 2018).
Russia and China seek to be the regional hegemon or create a sphere of influence
since projecting force across the world is costly and hard. Under the One Belt, One Road
initiative, China seeks to establish a trade block with sixty states, while hoping to shift
the global economy to its favor, thus altering the global balance of power. China will
seek safe Polar Silk Road routes protected by Russian forces. Once states have an Arctic
sphere, states will protect their interests through proxy wars, international legal action,
and economic competition creating Cold War 2.0. America can either allow the new
Polar Silk Road and a shift in the balance of power or seek to stymie the progress through
sanctions/force. There will always be security competition, and it will be intense at times
when states seek either regional or global hegemony.
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Chapter 6:
Conclusion:
Currently, it seems like liberalism would best describe Arctic international
relations. This is because regional governance based on mutual interests increased
significantly since the end of the Cold War. However, the stakes were low since
development was near impossible and extremely costly. Also, regional governance tends
to either focus on Russia or the U.S., while leaving the other great power outside the
governance structure. Second, some states don’t want Arctic governance to focus on
security issues because they do not want to limit their sovereignty in the region. The U.S.
seeks to contain any regional governance that might infringe on their actions and is
against any transformation of the Arctic Council’s mandate. Third, the U.S. and Russia
will most likely not be able to solve the “easy disputes” of Syria, Ukraine, and border
issues. Fourth, the U.S. is unlikely to end sanctions on Russia, further impeding any
Arctic cooperation between the two states. Finally, the Arctic has no framework or lacks
a strong enough collective security to stop a large power from partaking in unilateral
action when its interests are challenged. These reasons are why a liberal framework will
be unable to explain the region. Arctic states will assume the worst-case scenarios that
don’t necessarily reflect current international relations because they are uncertain of each
other’s intentions, and “choose to play it safe” (Atland 2014 p.152).
Arctic development is becoming cheaper and the main driver of Russian interests
(Laruelle 2014). Every state publicly stated the need for diplomacy and international law,
although Russia and the U.S. stated they are willing to use force when necessary. It
appears when the regional order or international law doesn’t favor Russia, they will use
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their regional military advantage to defend their interests (Staun 2017). The region’s lack
of governance structure won’t stop great powers under the anarchic system. The United
Nations Security Council will also be unable to stop a conflict, as China, Russia, and the
U.S. each hold veto power, and would block any resolution. When interests clash
between Russia, China, and the U.S., tensions will rise, and it appears realism will offer a
better explanation since great powers will ignore Arctic norms and international laws.
However, states will avoid a total nuclear war since MAD threatens the survival of the
state.
Russian northern forces atrophied before Putin sought a sphere of influence in
2008, while the U.S. has been reluctant to focus on the Arctic because they have other
issues around the globe. This gives Russia a regional advantage over any Western
military. However, the DOD committed to invest and improve American forces to deter
aggression in the Arctic (DOD 2016). Putin and Russia will negatively view any U.S. or
NATO militarization of the region, possibly triggering an arms race. However, the DOD
cautions against spending too much time, money and effort in the region with other, high
threat risks and austerity (DOD 2010). This could allow the U.S. to escape from the
security dilemma, but possibly underestimate Putin’s desire for a sphere of influence. The
U.S. cedes regional hegemon status to Russia and China, allowing the two states to forge
a new regional order that resembles the Silk Road, thus returning the world to two
economic blocks. As Cold War 2.0 gets underway, militaries will posture, and proxies
might fight, but due to nuclear weapons, neither bloc will directly confront each other.
Under a new order, China and Russia will keep the region stable to increase economic
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investment and opportunities, while China seeks to become the global economic
juggernaut via the Silk Road.
Another possibility is Russia will argue they are protecting Russian minorities to
occupy areas that don’t trigger a NATO reaction. With various agreements and claims on
Arctic territory, Russia might try to occupy a NATO member’s territorial claim like
Denmark’s. Without any deaths, NATO is unlikely to invoke Article Five because of its
slow decision-making structure and defense cuts, leaving members to most likely debate
the issue without any action (Eyal 2014). “As presently postured, NATO cannot
successfully defend the territory of its most exposed members” (Shlapak and Johnson
2016 p. 6). This gives Russia an incentive to increase the size of their economic bloc
while being able to use Peter the Great and Soviet historical claims of returning Russia to
superpower imperial status.
Russia can ignore the norms of territorial aggression due to inadequate NATO
defense and their regional offensive advantage (Shirreff 2016). If Russia claimed territory
in either the Baltic or the Arctic, Moscow would quickly work to annex that land to make
it part of the Russian Federation. NATO would either have to accept the occupation or
launch a counter-offensive that might develop into a nuclear war, both bad options for the
West (Shlapak and Johnson 2016). If the U.S. accepted occupation, a new Russian sphere
of influence would be created and another Berlin-like wall or ship patrols potentially
would fortify the new border. Depending on whether the collective defense agreement
failed to protect another member’s sovereignty, this would allow Russia to sow seeds to
undermine NATO. However, like other Russian Arctic regulations, the U.S. will probably
reject any new claims, arguing Russia is acting beyond its territorial waters. The U.S.
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argued in NSPD-66 the Navy can protect the freedom of navigation and U.S. interests in
the Northern Sea Route (U.S. Navy 2014). The U.S. may exercise their sovereign rights
in the Arctic to protect natural resources since energy is a national interest (White House
2009). This worries Russia, as they are concerned an ice-free Arctic will allow Western
warships with missile systems to travel into their EEZ (Russian Federation 2015).
However, Russia has argued they have the localization dominance due to their coastline,
icebreaker fleet and military strength in the region. The U.S. doesn’t have any plans to
match Russia’s regional dominance preventing a security dilemma.
Since the end of World War II, states have either jockeyed for power and position
within various international organizations or tried to limit the expansion of those
organizations to ensure more unilateral actions if necessary. States will use international
organizations like UNCLOS and Arctic Five to try to legally exclude other states from
developing resources while ensuring their future economy won’t be impeded by
regulations or other states. Once Russia establishes a boundary and favorable regional
governance, they will secure the area to protect Chinese trade. Whenever a new regional
order is established, the marriage of convenience might end as both Russia and China
seek to become the regional economic hegemon, causing tension between the two
neighboring states. However, complex interdependence in the Arctic might keep the two
states from using military force as they would hurt the Polar Silk Road economic
development.
Realism will become the best theory to describe Arctic relations when
development costs become cheaper and transit safer due to the lack of ice. “The tectonic
shifts that are happening are the rise of a powerful China… and the resurgence of a weak,
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but very dangerous, and well-armed Russia, so the return of a period of great power
competition is happening” (Flournoy 2017). Also, the U.S. is “guided by a return to
principled realism” (White House 2017). The risk of interstate war is increasing, and the
Arctic is not immune to energy security and geopolitics (Coats 2018).
Russia and China will seek to be the regional hegemon or create a sphere of
influence since projecting force across the world is costly and hard. Under the One Belt,
One Road initiative, China seeks to establish a trade block with sixty states, while hoping
to shift the global economy to its favor, thus altering the global balance of power. China
seeks safe Polar Silk Road routes protected by Russian forces. Once states have an Arctic
regional sphere that suits them, states will protect their interests by any means necessary.
The United States can either allow the new Polar Silk Road and a shift in the balance of
power or seek to stymie the progress through sanctions/force. There will always be
security competition, and it will be intense at times when states seek either regional or
global hegemony.
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